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I. INTRODUCTION
Over half a century ago, the drafters of the Model Penal Code
(MPG) demonstrated revolutionary lucidity when tackling the centuries-
old problem of defining and applying the principle of mens rea in the
criminal arena.1 Prior to that moment in legal history, judges and
academics certainly understood that mens rea-that is, a culpable
mental state-is a necessary component of moral blameworthiness, and
thus, a requirement for criminal punishment.2 Exactly how to describe
mens rea, however, remained elusive. Early legislatures and common-
law courts often used terms like "malicious," 3 "wicked," 4 or "depravity
of the will" 5 to describe the requisite intent of particular crimes. Later,
lawmakers and courts started to use more modem terminology-such as
"intentional," 6 "reckless disregard,"7 and "willful" 8-to describe mens
rea. In the United States, some jurisdictions, including the federal
courts, developed a system that divided crimes into two broad mens rea
categories-those requiring specific intent and those requiring merely
general intent-in an effort to solve most mens rea-related interpretive
issues.9 None of these developments, however, have made a significant
1. The American Law Institute developed the MPC through a series of drafts
of its different provisions; it wrote the first of these drafts in 1952. See Howard S.
Beyer, Model Penal Code Selected Bibliography, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 627, 628-34
(2001). The American Law Institute approved the Proposed Official Draft of the entire
Code in 1962. See id. at 634. Commentators have reviewed the Code's impact on
American criminal jurisprudence ever since. See, e.g., Symposium, The Model Penal
Code Revisited, 4 BUFF. CRiM. L. REv. 1 (2000); Richard G. Singer, Foreword to
Symposium, The 25th Anniversary of the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 519
(1988).
2. See, e.g., Dane C. Miller et al., Can Probation Be Revoked When
Probationers Do Not Willfully Violate the Terms or Conditions of Probation?, FED.
PROBATION, June 1999, at 23, 23 (noting that the concept of mens rea is centuries old).
3. See Regina v. Cunningham, 2 Q.B. 396 (Crim. App. 1957) (involving a
statute that used the term "maliciously").
4. See id. at 396-97 (reporting that the trial court interpreted "malicious" to
mean "wicked").
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21
(3d ed. 1769).
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2000) (making it unlawful under
certain circumstances to "intentionally" access a computer without authorization).
7. See, e.g., id. § 33(a) (making it a crime to place an explosive substance in
a motor vehicle with "reckless disregard" for the safety of human life).
8. See, e.g., id. § 1350(c) (making it a crime to "willfully" certify a
noncompliant report).
9. See United States v. Nix, 501 F.2d 516, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1974)
(indicating that this division is the "traditional analysis" for a federal case).
Mens Rea Analysis
contribution to clearing up the massive confusion surrounding these
concepts. 0
Early courts also recognized the difference between a defendant's
mens rea concerning the circumstances surrounding the defendant's
actions and the defendant's mens rea regarding whether those actions
constitute a crime, thus establishing the doctrines of mistake of fact and
mistake of law. In general, they held that a reasonable mistake of fact
could be a defense to criminal charges, 1 while "ignorance or mistake
of law [was] not a defense." 12 Courts, however, have neither
consistently applied nor fully developed these doctrines; 3 confusion on
the precise distinction between the two has reigned.' 4
In what can only be described as a rare moment of collective
genius, the MPC drafters cut through this legacy of incoherence."
Their historic accomplishment occurred on several discrete fronts:
First, the drafters developed a system of four levels of mens rea
designed to replace all other mens rea terms and to reflect the varying
blameworthiness of the criminal actor.'6 Second, and equally important,
they recognized that an element of mens rea effectively "attaches" to
each of the other material elements of any given crime-the actus reii
and attendant circumstances-and that the requisite mens rea for each of
these elements may in fact be different. Third, the MPC drafters
precisely articulated the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake
of law, and clarified the relationship between these concepts and mens
rea.18 Finally, they established a set of default rules for determining the
correct mens rea element to apply when specific mens rea terms are
missing from a statute.19
10. See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at
Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 341, 341-42
(2001) (arguing that mens rea confusion still abounds).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Short, 4 C.M.A. 437, 444 (1953).
12. See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d 382, 386 (1987).
13. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 283-85 (4th ed. 2003). For
example, many courts have failed to understand that the reasonableness requirement-
often attached to mistake-of-fact defenses-makes sense only if the requisite mens rea is
negligence. See id. at 284.
14. See id. at 282-83.
15. This Article is not the first to applaud the MPC drafters for their
contributions to this area. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element
Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability" The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 681, 685 (1983).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).
17. See id. § 2.02(1).
18. See id. §§ 2.02(9), 2.04(1).
19. See id. § 2.02(3)-(5).
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The MPC's "all new, all differentiated, mens rea scheme was
widely hailed as a significant advance, and rightly so." 20 In the forty
years following its inception, the MPC had a revolutionary influence on
the development of American criminal law. 2' As of 1983, the MPC had
impacted the revision of the criminal codes in thirty-six states;2 2 by
2002, that number had risen to roughly forty.23 In addition, just about
every law school's criminal-law course uses the MPC and its mens rea
provisions as a central teaching tool. 24 Despite all this, many legal
actors inexplicably continue to ignore the MPC's insight into mens rea
doctrine. A half century after the appearance of the MPC, there is
simply no excuse for courts, legislatures, and scholars to waste their
time using meaningless mens rea terms such as "willful; 2 1 to employ
the simplistic but ineffective distinction between specific- and general-
intent crimes; 26 to fail to see that mens rea questions are element-
specific; 27 or to misapprehend mistake-of-law questions for ones
presenting mistake of fact.2s
Participants in the federal arena are among the actors who have
completely disregarded the perspicacity of the MPC.29 From Congress
20. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 50 (2002).
21. See Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code's Culpability
Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing
the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 229, 229-30 (stating that the Code
spawned a revolution in substantive criminal law).
22. Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 683 & n. 10, 691-92 & n.45.
23. DUBBER, supra note 20, at 6.
24. See, e.g., id. at 5 ("Criminal law casebooks devote considerable space to
the Model Penal Code .... "); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS app. (7th ed. 2001)
(providing excerpts from the MPC).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509-10 (2d Cir.
1972) (discussing the meaning of "willfulness" in the context of securities law); Sharon
L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998).
26. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or
Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REv. 21, 32 (2001) (comparing
specific and general intent); United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1328 (9th Cir.
1976) (recognizing the distinction between specific and general intent).
27. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 683-85 (noting that, although
most jurisdictions have adopted some form of element analysis, vestiges of offense
analysis remain); infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (discussing the consistent
use of offense analysis).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 194, 219-29 (illustrating the frequent
confusion of these types of mistakes).
29. Although there have been many attempts to bring about a wholesale
revision of the federal criminal code based in part on the MPC, none have succeeded.
See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REv. 45, 92-139 (1998). Some believe that this failure is not necessarily a bad thing.
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and the Supreme Court on down, incoherence remains the name of the
game.3" Nowhere is this problem more pronounced than in the
interpretation of securities-related crimes. There are several reasons for
this: First, in the securities realm, the distinction between unlawful
conduct that is subject to private action or civil enforcement by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and unlawful conduct that
constitutes a crime largely depends on whether the perpetrator acted
"willfully. ' 31 Given the vast array and complex nature of securities-
related offenses, and the infinite variety of potentially criminal fact
patterns, a lot rests on the interpretation of this one word. 2 Second,
securities-related crimes often straddle the line between malum in se
and malum prohibitum, making mistake-of-law defenses potentially
germane. Courts look to the term "willful" to decide the viability of
these defenses as well.33 Third, civil securities-related cases, including
those interpreting the term "willful" as it appears in the civil context,
are generally considered precedent for criminal securities-related
cases. 34 Not surprisingly, all of this has led to multiple and conflicting
interpretations of this lone and humble word.
See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Hidden Costs, Illusory
Benefits, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 161, 188-89 (1998).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 211-72. This is not to say that the
federal courts do not look for help from the MPC and its mens rea concepts in deciding
cases. See DUBBER, supra note 20, at 7. The point is that ad hoc use of the MPC as an
occasional source of persuasive authority does not result in coherence.
31. , Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) provides that any
person who "willfully violates" any of its provisions, or any SEC rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder, or who willfully makes a misstatement or omission of a
material fact in any registration statement filed under the Securities Act, is guilty of a
felony. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2000). Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) likewise makes it a felony to willfully violate any of its provisions, or
any SEC rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, or to willfully and knowingly
make any false or misleading material misstatement in any application, report, or
document required to be filed under the Exchange Act. Id. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp. II
2004).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 275-304.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280, 183-85 (9th Cir. 1978)
(determining that a defendant who engaged in fraud cannot use a mistake-of-law
defense regarding whether the instrumentalities at issue were "securities"). It turns out
that there is more than one level of mistake-of-law defense, a critical point one misses
unless one hones in on the mistake of law at issue and examines this defense with great
care. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
34. See Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of
Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1025, 1041-42 (describing the Supreme Court's use of civil and criminal
securities cases as precedent for each other).
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Additionally, because the bulk of securities regulation is civil, 35
most securities-law experts are not experts in criminal law. They
recognize, of course, that "willfulness" has different meanings in
different circumstances, and also that courts divide as to its proper
interpretation under the same circumstance.36 Beyond this, however,
securities-law academics and other commentators have not done much
more than set out simple descriptions of the status quo37 or make
relatively unsophisticated arguments that willfulness should have some
particular meaning, usually taken from case law-such as acting "not
merely 'voluntarily' but with a bad purpose"38  or acting with
knowledge of the physical consequences but without knowingly
breaking the law .3  They have, in addition, staked out different
positions as to whether it should have (or has) the same or different
meanings in civil and criminal usage. 4 All told, none of these
individuals have indicated any understanding of the fundamentals of
mens rea under the MPC; and, certainly, none have attempted to apply
these fundamentals to bring coherence to this extremely important area
of the law.
35. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1662 (2006) ("Although most of the public enforcement of
federal securities laws is done through the civil and administrative powers of the SEC,
federal law allows for broad criminal enforcement of the Securities and Exchange
Acts. ").
36. See infra Part III.B.
37. See, e.g., XueMing Jimmy Cheng et al., Securities Fraud, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1079, 1088-89 (2004); Robert F. Koets, What Constitutes "Willfulness" for
Purposes of Criminal Provisions of Federal Securities Laws, 136 A.L.R. FED. 457, § 2
(1997); William E. Aiken, Jr., Element of Scienter as Affecting Criminal Prosecutions
for Violation of Federal Securities Law, 20 A.L.R. FED. 227, § 2 (1974); Norwood P.
Beveridge, Is Mens Rea Required for a Criminal Violation of the Federal Securities
Laws?, 52 Bus. LAW. 35, 47-59 (1996). Professor Norwood Beveridge's ultimate
conclusion is that willfulness in the criminal arena must mean "criminal intent," which
he defines as "knowingly wrongful conduct." Id. at 64. This definition is not specific
enough to provide guidance.
38. William B. Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139, 148 & n.23 (1934) (listing cases that refer to a "bad
purpose").
39. See Arthur F. Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal
Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal
Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 950-51 (1971). There is, of course, significant
tension between these two definitions. Id. at 951.
40. Compare, e.g., Sachs, supra note 34, at 1025 (arguing for the "core
principle"-that prohibitions in hybrid statutes should be limited to one interpretation),
with JED S. RAKOFF & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, RICO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND
STRATEGY § 7.07[3] (1989 & Supp. 2006) (concluding that there is a presumption in
hybrid statutes that Congress intends to require a mens rea element for civil actions but
not for criminal ones).
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As shocking as it may seem to criminal-law aficionados, this
Article represents the very first effort to bring coherence to mens rea
analysis for securities-related offenses. It rests on the underlying
principle that the general methodology for defining and applying mens
rea set out by the MPC is not a matter of preference, ideology, or
interpretive choice; rather, it is a matter of logical necessity and
essential to a clear understanding of the choices that face legislatures
and courts contending with securities-related crimes. Part II of the
Article sets out MPC methodology in some detail. Part III describes the
present state of mens rea analysis (or lack thereof) in the securities
arena. Part IV applies the methodology of Part II to the problems
identified in Part III, demonstrating the potential for coherence in this
area of the law.
II. UNDERSTANDING MENS REA
One of the foundational principles of the American criminal-justice
system is that punishment is only appropriate if a person acts
voluntarily (actus reus) and with some level of intention (mens rea) to
bring about or risk the harm that a penal statute sought to prevent. 41
The reasons for this principle stem from the two traditional purposes of
punishment: retribution and deterrence.42  Retribution is the
deontological notion that a person who commits a crime deserves to be
punished. 43 The converse of this proposition-employing retribution as
a limiting principle-is equally true. A person who fails to act
voluntarily (such as by way of reflex or subject to duress) simply
should not be punished. 44 Likewise, a person who has no level of
intention (such as one whose mental illness prevents comprehension of
reality) merits treatment, not punishment.4 5 Fundamental fairness
dictates these results.
Deterrence involves the prevention of future criminal activity by
the defendant (specific deterrence) and others (general deterrence). 46 A
41. See LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 239, 243.
42. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that
retribution and deterrence are the "traditional aims of punishment").
43. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179,
179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
44. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962) (requiring a voluntary act for
criminal liability).
45. See M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) (setting out the
insanity defense).
46. The father of deterrence theory is Jeremy Bentham. See Jeremy Bentham,
Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396, 402 (John
2006:1563 1569
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person who causes harm without any level of mens rea whatsoever-
that is, a person who has exercised all due care-cannot be deterred
from acting in the future by being punished now.47 Because punishment
would be futile, imposing it would undermine confidence in and respect
for the criminal law.48
Accepting the necessity of mens rea as a prerequisite to finding an
individual guilty of a crime and pinpointing exactly what is meant by
mens rea, however, are two very different things.49 Courts and
commentators long ago recognized the importance of mens rea, but
they were extremely slow in peeling away its layers and comprehending
its intricacies. It was not until the American Law Institute published the
first draft of the MPC in 1955, which intelligently sorted out mens rea
issues, that significant progress was made on this front.5' The
importance of this development is incalculable: a cogent understanding
of the logic of mens rea is a necessary prerequisite to the identification
and evaluation of the mens rea-related policy choices available to the
legislatures that draft criminal statutes and the courts that interpret
them.
Bowring ed., 1843). Its most prominent modem-day advocate is Judge Richard Posner.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242-43 (5th ed. 1998). The
debate about the efficacy of deterrence is beyond the scope of this Article, but many
commentators have written on the issue. See, e.g., JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: OUR
DEADLY EPIDEMIC AND ITS CAUSES (1996); MARK S. FLEISHER, BEGGARS AND THIEVES:
LIVES OF URBAN STREET CRIMINALS (1995); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232
(1985); Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Pum'shment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949 (1966); Johs Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176 (1952).
47. Some have argued that deterrence is ineffective even when the actor has
the mens rea of negligence. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART § 43, at 122-23 (2d ed. 1961) ("Again, the deterrent theory, which is normally
accepted as a justification for criminal punishment, finds itself in some difficulty when
applied to negligence. . . . Even if a person admits that he occasionally makes a
negligent mistake, how, in the nature of things, can punishment for inadvertence serve
to deter?").
48. Cf Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1366-68 (1985) (arguing that
unacceptable verdicts would undermine public confidence in the law).
49. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
50. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 683, 685.
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A. The Model Penal Code's Culpability Provisions
In what has been called the "most significant and enduring
achievement of the Code's authors," 51 the MPC discarded the "eighty
or so culpability terms found in [prior] criminal codes, 52 and distilled
them into four coherent levels of intentionality .5 The most culpable
state of mind is purpose-defined as the situation in which it is the
defendant's "conscious object to engage in conduct ... or to cause...
a result" 54 prohibited by a statute. Obviously, when the result is a
prohibited harm, the fact that the defendant consciously desires to bring
it about entails extraordinary culpability. It should be noted that
purpose is rarely the required mens rea for the commission of a
crime .
The second most blameworthy mens rea level is knowledge.56
According to the MPC, "A person acts knowingly with respect to...
the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances [when] he is
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist."" Similarly, a person acts knowingly with respect.to a result of
the offensive conduct when that person is "aware that it is practically
certain that [the] conduct will cause such a result. "58 Knowledge differs
from purpose in that it does not contain any element of motivation.59
Indeed, the defendant may affirmatively want to avoid the prohibited
harm, but if the defendant is practically certain that it will occur despite
hopes and prayers, the defendant has knowledge.6" It is safe to say that
51. Id. at 691.
52. Id. at 692.
53. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(2). In fact, the drafters
of the MPC were so keen on making a clean break from the past that they refused to
use the term "mens rea," and employed the word "culpability" in its place. See id. §
2.02(2) cmt. 1, at 230 (including the term "mens rea" in a list of concepts that
historically had obscured the requirement of culpability). This Article uses "mens rea"
in its traditional sense, and "culpability" to mean "blameworthiness."
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962).
55. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 2, at 234 ("It is
true, of course, that th[e] distinction [between purpose and knowledge] is
inconsequential for most purposes of liability; acting knowingly is ordinarily
sufficient.").
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
57. Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(i).
58. Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).
59. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 2.
60. See id.
2006:1563 1571
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knowledge is the most ubiquitous mens rea requirement in federal
criminal law.61
The third level of mens rea identified by the MPC is recklessness.
Under MPC section 2.02(2)(c), a person acts recklessly "when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that the
circumstances specified by the statute exist or that the conduct at issue
will result in the harm sought to be prevented by the statute.62 Unlike a
person who acts purposely or knowingly, one who acts recklessly is
subject to punishment not for the intended action, but simply for the
risk created. 63 The defendant's conduct, however, must be "of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding citizen would observe in the actor's situation." ' The end result
of this provision is that the fact-finder must weigh the degree of risk
(balanced against any claimed justification for creating it) and the
severity of the harm being risked to determine whether the defendant
acted recklessly.65
The lowest level of mens rea set out by the MPC is negligence. 6
The Code provides that "[a] person acts negligently . . . when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that the
circumstances specified by the statute exist or that the person's conduct
will result in the harm sought to be prevented by the statute. 67 Like
recklessness, the negligent defendant is blameworthy because of the
risk created;68 unlike recklessness, the negligent defendant is unaware
of the surrounding circumstances or the harm risked, and thus is less
61. But see Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 729 (claiming that
recklessness is the most commonly required level of mens rea). Most federal criminal
law draws a distinction between specific- and general-intent crimes. See supra note 9
and accompanying text. Specific-intent crimes usually require the equivalent of purpose
as to one or more elements; general-intent crimes generally require the equivalent of
knowledge. See JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND
MATERIALS 111 (2d ed. 2003) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405
(1980)) (asserting that "general intent," in the context of federal law, is roughly
equivalent to "knowledge" in the Model Penal Code); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, Supra
note 24, at 216 (stating that "general intent" typically means that the defendant "knew
the nature of the acts ... performed").
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
63. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c).
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 3.
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
67. Id.
68. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 4.
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culpable than an actor with such awareness. 69 The MPC defines
negligence as a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation., 70 This
distinguishes criminal negligence under the MPC from ordinary tort
negligence, for which the deviation from reasonableness need not be
gross.71
A few comments about the MPC's culpability provisions are in
order. First, it is important to note that the Code sets forth its mens rea
standards for the purpose of specifying the requirements for conviction
under any given criminal statute.72 For this purpose, the four levels of
mens rea are, and should be treated as, separate and distinct. In reality,
however, the levels of mens rea are merely points along a continuum of
intentionality. Because mens rea resides in the defendant's mind, it is
often proven through circumstantial evidence. In the process of
evaluating such evidence, the fact-finder will often make inferences that
"slide up" the mens rea scale.
For example, the fact-finder might conclude from the evidence that
a reasonable person "should have known" of the harm risked by the
defendant (negligence); that the defendant, being reasonably aware and
intelligent, "must have known" of the harm risked (recklessness); and,
ultimately, that the prospect of causing the harm was so high, the
defendant must have known not only of the risk created, but also of the
fact that the conduct in question was practically certain to cause it
(knowledge). This evidential route to the conclusion that the defendant
had the mens rea of knowledge must not be confused with the statute's
absolute requirement of knowledge as the mens rea element the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Put another way, if
the statute requires mens rea in the form of knowledge, the defendant
must be acquitted if the fact-finder does not conclude that the defendant
actually knew that the conduct would cause the harm-even if the fact-
finder believes that the defendant should have been or was aware of the
risk.
Another point of interest is what the MPC leaves out. There is no
provision in section 2.02 for absolute or strict liability-that is, liability
with no level of mens rea.7 This absence can be attributed to the
MPC's rejection of the notion that a person may be held criminally
69. See id.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d).
71. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 4, at 241-42.
72. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1. 13(9)(b) (stating that culpability is a material
element of an offense).
73. See id. § 2.02.
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responsible without some level of mental culpability74 and of the
common-law development of "public welfare offenses."75 In place of
these offenses, the MPC set up a new category of pseudocrimes, called
"violations," placed below felonies and misdemeanors.76 No prison
sentences were associated with violations;77 presumably, the MPC
drafters desired them to be more serious in terms of stigma than the
enforcement of civil penalties, while not rising to the level of true
crimes. This aspect of the MPC has not been influential-especially as
it pertains to federal law, where the public-welfare-offenses doctrine is
alive and well.78
The second great contribution of the MPC to criminal-law analysis
was its recognition that every crime can be broken down into its
elements.79 One of these elements is the voluntary conduct necessary to
violate the statute;" another is the mens rea requirement."1 In addition,
a statute might require proving the existence of one or more factual
conditions, which the MPC calls "attendant circumstances."82 It also
might require proving a particular result,83 which then implies the need
to prove that the defendant's conduct caused that result.84 Additionally,
the Code considers the prosecution's responsibility to negative excuse,
justification, and statute-of-limitation defenses as elements of the
offense, because the prosecution must ultimately overcome these
nonaffirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.85 Likewise, the
MPC categorizes jurisdiction and venue requirements as elements
because the prosecution carries the burden of proving these as well.86
74. See id. § 2.02(1). There are a few exceptions to this statement. For
example, the MPC acknowledged prevailing views of statutory rape and provided that,
under certain circumstances, a defendant is strictly liable regarding the element of the
victim's age. See id. § 213.6(1).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671-72 (1975).
76. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04.
77. See id. § 1.04 explanatory note.
78. See Park, 421 U.S. at 671-72; see also Hanousek v. United States, 528
U.S. 1102, 1102-03 (2000) (identifying the defining characteristic of a public-welfare
offense as "some category of dangerous or deleterious devices that will be assumed to
alert an individual that he stands in 'responsible relation to a public danger.'" (quoting
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613 n.6 (1994))).
79. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9).
80. See id. § 1.13(9).
81. Seeid. § 1.13(9)(b).
82. See id. § 1.13(9).
83. See id.
84. See id. § 2.03 (defining causation).
85. Seeid. § 1.13(9)(c).
86. See id. § 1.13(9)(e).
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The defense, technical-limitations, and jurisdictional elements,
however, are designated as "non-material" under section 1.13(10).87
B. Element Analysis
The true genius of the MPC comes in its discerning the
relationship between mens rea and the other elements of a crime. In
section 2.02(1), the MPC provides that "a person is not guilty of an
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently,
as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the
offense."" In effect, the MPC authors recognized that mens rea is
fundamentally different from all other elements: it does not "free-
float"; rather, it "attaches to" the other material elements of the
offense.89 Moreover, the mens rea requirement for various elements of
an offense may, in fact, be different.9° Thus, the law might require that,
to be found guilty, a defendant must know that certain circumstances
exist but merely be reckless about whether the offensive conduct would
cause the prohibited harm in light of these circumstances." 1 After
recognizing the logic of "element analysis,"92 one is forced to conclude
that all talk about the mens rea requirement for a criminal offense-or
"offense analysis"-is literally incoherent.93 Unfortunately, offense
analysis "continues to exist as the dominant view of mens rea.94
The common-law crime of burglary can be used to illustrate
element analysis. A typical definition of this crime is "knowingly
enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a building with intent to commit
a crime therein," when the building is a dwelling.95 The crime,
therefore, has three elements: (1) the defendant must enter or remain in
a building, (2) the defendant must intend to commit a crime, and (3) the
building in question must be a dwelling. As generally construed, the
87. Seeid. § 1.13(10).
88. Id § 2.02(1) (emphasis added).
89. See Robinson & Grail, supra note 15, at 687.
90. See id.
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)-(c).
92. See Robinson & Grail, supra note 15, at 691-700. "Element analysis
provides the comprehensiveness, clarity and precision needed to give fair notice and to
limit governmental discretion, as required by the legality principle." Id. at 703.
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985); cf Robinson & Grall, supra note 15, at 688 &
nn.32-34;
94. Robinson & Grail, supra note 15, at 688.
95. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.25 (Consol. 2007); see also FLA. STAT. §
810.02(1)(a) (2006) ("'[Blurglary' means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a
structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein .... ).
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mens rea necessary to convict an individual of burglary is different as
to each element. 96 For the first element, the requisite mens rea is
knowledge: the defendant must knowingly enter a building." For the
second element, it is purpose: it must be the defendant's conscious
object to commit a crime in the building.98 For the third element, there
is no requisite mens rea, and the defendant is strictly liable on the issue
of whether the building is a dwelling.99
C. Default Rules
Lest one conclude that element analysis is hopelessly
complicated-that it is a theory that is brilliant but not useful°-the
MPC has a number of default rules, which make its application much
simpler than might first appear." 1 Section 2.02(3) provides that, when a
statute has left out a mens rea term in connection with any particular
material element, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted at
least recklessly with respect to that element. 10 2 In addition, section
2.02(4) provides that, when a statute contains a mens rea requirement
"without distinguishing among the material elements thereof," the
presumption is that the stated mens rea requirement applies to all
material elements of the offense. 10 3 This presumption can be rebutted by
demonstrating that a "contrary [legislative] purpose plainly appears. ""
In theory, an element-analysis-enlightened legislature creating a
criminal code would not need these default provisions; instead, it would
provide the appropriate mens rea for each element of every crime.0 5
Alternatively, a legislature could enact a different set of default rules-
for instance, by designating "knowledge" as its minimum default mens
rea and providing that any mens rea element specified in a statute be
interpreted to apply only to the material element immediately following
96. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.25
97. See id. § 140.25(1).
98. See id; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1962).
99. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.25(2).
100. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv.
917 (1986) (arguing that "thoughtfulness" is a higher virtue in the legal field); see also
Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987).
101. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3)-(10).
102. See id. § 2.02(3).
103. Id. § 2.02(4).
104. Id.
105. Admittedly, this would lead to long and perhaps unnecessarily complex
definitions of crimes. See DUBBER, supra note 20, at 52 (calling statutes spelling out
mens rea for each element "monstrous concoctions"). To avoid this, a legislature could
establish default rules.
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it-and still maintain a perfectly coherent result. The requirements for a
logical system are simply element analysis and levels of intentionality
(graded to reflect increasing culpability), 06 The MPC drafters adopted
default rules that comported with their sensibilities and fit with
prevailing norms.' 07
It is in this vein that one must view the MPC drafters' decision to
define "willfulness" as knowledge in section 2.02(8).108 Some
commentators have pointed to this provision as evidence of what this
term means, or should mean, with respect to its usage in a particular
penal statute.' °9 Once one realizes that "willfulness" is not part of the
MPC's mens rea lexicon, however, one should understand the fallacy
of relying on section 2.02(8). The MPC drafters were well aware that
the term "willfulness" appeared in a multitude of enacted criminal
statutes," 0 and they wanted to give legislatures and courts a simple
method to dispose of this apparently meaningless word."' For that
purpose, knowledge-one level higher than the usual default mens rea
of recklessness-seemed to be a reasonable translation. 112 The MPC
drafters were certainly not trying to determine how "willfulness"
should be defined with respect to any specific element of any particular
statute." 3 Such a definition can only be based on the legislative history
and underlying policies of the statute." 4
D. The Relationship Between Mens Rea and Mistake of Fact and the
Distinction Between Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law
The MPC authors made two more critical contributions to a lucid
understanding of mens rea analysis: the relationship between mens rea
and mistake of fact, and the distinction between mistake of fact and
mistake of law. As to the former, section 2.04 of the MPC makes it
clear that mistake of fact and mens rea are simply two different ways of
106. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
107. See id.
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8).
109. See, e.g., Charles M. Carberry & Harold K. Gordon, Alter O'Hagan:
Less Expansive Duties and Higher Mental States Restrict Criminal Securities Law
Prosecutions, in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
INVESTIGATION, SETTLEMENT & LITIGATION 165, 179-80 (1997).
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 10, at 248.
111. See id. § 2.02 cmt. 10, at 249-50.
112. See id. at 248.
113. See id. at 249.
114. See id.
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talking about the same thing." 5 Section 2.04(1)(a) provides that mistake
"as to a matter of fact or law" 16 can be used as a defense if it
"negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence
required to establish a material element of the offense."".7 This
provision demonstrates that a defendant's "mistake" about some fact or
circumstance is the same as not having the requisite mens rea regarding
that fact or circumstance. 8 Figuring out whether the mistake provides
the defendant with a viable defense, then, depends entirely on
identifying the required mens rea for the element at issue."'
Assume, for instance, that Felonious Frank is charged with passing
a counterfeit note. Frank claims that he made a "mistake" because he
believed that the note was genuine. If the requisite mens rea is
knowledge, then the mistake is a defense-even if Frank was aware of
the risk that the bill was counterfeit, or if he was blissfully ignorant of
the risk but a reasonable person would have been aware. 2° Next,
assume that the requisite mens rea on the element of the note being
counterfeit is recklessness. Now, to have a successful mistake defense,
Frank must contend (and the jury must find) either that he was not
aware of this risk or that he was aware but still did not act in a manner
that constituted a gross deviation from the conduct of a law-abiding
citizen (or both)."'2 Otherwise, though it may be true that Frank did not
know the note was counterfeit, he was reckless, which is all that the
statute requires. Finally, assume that the requisite mens rea is
negligence. Now Frank must convince the jury not only that he did not
know that the bill was counterfeit, but also that he was not even aware
of this risk and acted reasonably under the circumstances.' 2
115. See id. § 2.04 cmt. 1 (discussing the relationship between ignorance or
mistake and culpability).
116. It should be noted that, in including the word "law" here, the MPC is
referring to two distinct things: (1) mistakes of "legal facts" that exist outside of the
criminal law arena, which are simply treated as mistakes of fact; and (2) mistakes of the
criminal law, which are presumed not to be included in the definition of the crime
unless the statute provides otherwise. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9) (1962). To
understand the notion of "legal fact," consider the following. A defendant who is
charged with polygamy may claim that he thought he had a valid divorce from his first
wife, and therefore was not aware that he was married to two people at once. His
mistake regarding the validity of his divorce is one of family law, and is thus treated as
a "legal fact." Under section 2.04(a), this mistake is a defense if it negates the requisite
mens rea. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 11, at 250.
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (1962).
118. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04 cmt. 1.
119. See id.
120. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
121. See id § 2.02(2)(c).
122. See id. § 2.02(2)(d).
1578
Mens Rea Analysis
The MPC also clarifies the distinction between mistake of fact and
mistake of law. Section 2.02(9) provides that "[n]either knowledge nor
recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes a defense
or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining
the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the
definition of the offense or the Code so provides. ,123 In other words,
the presumption is that a defendant need not have any level of mens rea
regarding the existence or the interpretation of the criminal law itself-
the defendant is to be held strictly liable on the question of whether the
conduct at issue constitutes a crime.'24 This is an elegant way of stating
that ignorance or mistake of the criminal law is no excuse. 121
A legislature can, of course, decide to make mistake of the
criminal law a defense to a specific crime by making the definition of
the criminal law an element of the crime, thereby requiring proof that
the defendant had some level of understanding of the criminal law as a
prerequisite to conviction.'26 Once this is done, mistake of criminal law
is treated like all other mistakes, and it is a defense if it negates the
required mens rea.2 7 By defining mistake of law this way, the MPC
makes it clear that a legislature is free to attach any mens rea
requirement to a "definition of the criminal law" element: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.
A real-life example of a legislatively imposed mistake-of-criminal-
law element can be found in connection with federal criminal tax
offenses. In United States v. Murdock, the Supreme Court held that
Congress intended to add such an element to tax offenses through the
use of the term "willfully.' ' 128 Many years later, in Cheek v. United
States, the Court further determined that Congress intended to attach a
mens rea requirement of knowledge to the mistake-of-criminal-law
element.' 9 Thus, in criminal tax cases, the government must prove that
the defendant knowingly violated the relevant portions of the tax code
as a prerequisite to conviction. Because of the knowledge requirement,
the defendant's mistake need not be reasonable, and it is insufficient for
123. Id. § 2.02(9).
124. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 11.
125. Mistakes regarding some other area of the law-such as family or contract
law-are treated as mistakes of "fact or law" under section 2.04(1)(a). In this Article,
the term "mistake of fact" encompasses such mistakes.
126. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(9); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 11.
127. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a).
128. 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).
129. 498 U.S. 192, 206-07 (1991).
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the government to prove merely that the defendant was aware of a risk
of violating the law. 30
It is critical to recognize that there are different types of mistake-
of-law defenses. The classic, "robust," version (described above) arises
out of the requirement that, to be found criminally liable, the defendant
must have had some level of awareness that the conduct at issue was in
specific violation of the criminal law.' Sometimes, however, a court
interprets a statute to require proof only that the defendant was aware
of the generally wrongful nature of the offensive conduct.'32 In these
cases, the prosecution need not prove that the defendant knew the
conduct at issue was in violation of a specific law or even unlawful in
general.'33 From this requirement follows a "weak" mistake-of-law
defense, one requiring the defendant to plead ignorance of the basic
wrongfulness of the offensive conduct.'34
III. THE STATE OF MENS REA ANALYSIS FOR SECURITIES-RELATED
CRIMES
The prosecution of securities-related crimes in the United States is
undoubtedly cyclical in nature and reflects the business cycle. When the
stock market is riding high, crime certainly occurs, but few complain
because everyone is making money. When the market comes crashing
down, there are suddenly many losers in the market who have an
incentive to look for others to blame. This provides prosecutors with
complainants and evidence."' Politicians are often in the hot seat as
well, accused by the public of thoughtless deregulation or of not
controlling big business's ability to take advantage of the little guy.'36
They respond not only by enacting new laws, but also by putting
130. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)-(d) (defining the different levels of
culpability).
131. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200 (holding that Cheek was entitled to a mistake-of-
law defense which required a showing that his action constituted a "voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty" (quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S.
346, 360 (1973))). This Article refers to this type of mistake-of-law defense as the
.robust" version, because the requirement is stringent and thus the defense is powerful.
132. See United States v. Tarvestad, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1969).
133. See id. (approving trial judge's instruction that defined "willfully" as
"done knowingly and deliberately with bad purpose").
134. This type of mistake-of-law defense is "weak" because it provides the
defendant with much less leeway than the "robust" version.
135. See Eric F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic. Bubbles and the Growth and
Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006).
136. See id. at 431-32.
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pressure on prosecutors to bring more securities-related cases. 137 A
crash in the market thus leads to a boom in white-collar prosecutions.
The United States saw two such booms in recent memory, the first after
the savings and loan crisis in the late 1980s 38 and the second after the
"tech bubble" burst in 2000.139
Prosecution of securities-related crime, however, is only the tip of
the securities-regulation iceberg. Most securities regulation is
administrative or civil in nature, achieved either through private actions
filed by aggrieved plaintiffs or through enforcement actions brought by
137. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics,
Professionalism and The Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 878
("Sarbanes-Oxley reflects the current enforcement climate: legislators, law enforcement
authorities, and the public are united in demanding greater corporate accountability."
(citation omitted)).
138. See ERISK, CASE STUDY: US SAVINGS & LOAN CRISIS (2002),
http://www.erisk.com/Leaming/CaseStudies/USSLCaseStudy.pdf.
139. The most high-profile tech-bubble prosecutions were of Arthur Andersen,
Kenneth Lay, and Jeffrey Skilling in connection with the Enron debacle; for a
comprehensive analysis, see ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
(Nancy P. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). Some other high-profile cases
involved Martha Stewart, see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider
Violations of Rule l0b-5 for Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L.
REV. 380 (2006); Samuel Waksal of ImClone, see Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges
Former ImClone CEO Samuel Waksal with Illegal Insider Trading (June 12, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-87.htm; Martin Grass, Frank Bergonzi, and
Franklin Brown of Rite Aid, see Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Fraud Charges
Against Former Rite Aid Senior Management (June 21, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-92.htm; Richard Scrushy of HealthSouth, see
Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges HealthSouth Corp. CEO Richard Scrushy with $1.4
Billion Accounting Fraud (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
34.htm; John Rigas, Timothy J. Rigas, Michael J. Rigas, James P. Rigas, James R.
Brown, and Michael C. Mulcahey of Adelphia, see Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges
Adelphia and Rigas Family with Massive Financial Fraud (July 24, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-110.htm; Qwest Communications, see Press
Release, SEC, SEC Charges Qwest Communications International Inc. with Multi-
Faceted Accounting and Financial Reporting Fraud (Oct. 21, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-148.htm; and Dennis Kozlowski, Mark H.
Swartz, and Mark A. Belnick of Tyco, see Press Release, SEC, SEC Sues Former
Tyco CEO Kozlowski, Two Others for Fraud (Sept. 12, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-135.htm.
Although many of these cases continue and others will follow, from the public's
perspective the cycle of crime generated by the tech bubble likely ended with the
convictions of Lay and Skilling in May 2006. See Christopher Palmeri, It's the Enron
Effect, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 30, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/
bwdaily/dnflash/may2006/nf20060530_2664_dbOl6.htm; Kurt Eichenwald, Verdict on
an Era, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at C1.
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the SEC.'" The SEC pursues civil actions under a variety of statutory
provisions, the most important of which are found in the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act)"' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).' 42 Together with other securities-related enactments,
these Acts, along with all of the rules and regulations promulgated by
the SEC pursuant to its statutory authority, create a vast regulatory
structure in the securities arena.
As a general matter, the Securities Act addresses the offer and sale
of securities to public investors by mandating (absent an applicable
exemption) the filing of a registration statement 143 containing specified
information' 44 with the SEC and the dissemination of a prospectus to
investors during the distribution of securities. 45 The Securities Act also
imposes a complex liability scheme for misinformation in the
prospectus, registration statement, or other communications made
during the distribution of securities.'" Finally, it makes unlawful the
failure to register nonexempt securities or transactions. "' The Exchange
Act created the SEC' and provides for the regulation of stock
exchanges'49 and securities firms. 5 ' It requires periodic and event-based
disclosure of key information by public companies,' 1 and prohibits
manipulative stock-market practices 52 and misleading statements in
140. See, e.g., Billy Kloos et al., Securities Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 921,
980 (2006) ("[Tjhe SEC is the principal agency responsible for the enforcement of
federal securities law .... ).
141. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
142. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, 48 Stat.
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000 & Supp. II 2004)).
Congress passed these statutes in reaction to the stock-market crash of 1929 and the
Great Depression. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976).
143. See Securities Act § 6.
144. See id. § 7.
145. See id. § 10.
146. See, e.g., id. §§ 8A, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17.
147. See id. § 5; cf Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 ("The Securities Act of 1933
was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against
fraud, and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing.").
148. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2000 & Supp. II
2004).
149. See id. § 6.
150. See id. § 15.
151. See ld. § 13.
152. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-10.
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mandated reports and other documents.' 3 The Exchange Act also
regulates margin requirements for stock purchases and insider trading
in the securities of public companies."5 4 Over the years, Congress has
amended and supplemented both Acts-for instance, through passing
the Investment Company Act of 1940,155 the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940,156 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.157
The drafters of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act decided
that civil enforcement and private causes of action were not sufficient
remedies to punish and deter potential violators. Therefore, they grafted
a criminal-penalties provision onto both statutes. Specifically, section
24 of the Securities Act makes it a crime to "willfully" violate any of
the Act's provisions or "the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission under authority thereof."' 58 It also criminalizes "willfully"
making "any untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state
any material fact required to be stated [in a registration statement] or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading."1"9 Using
similar language, section 32(a) of the Exchange Act states that "[a]ny
person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter . . . or any
rule or regulation thereunder" is guilty of a crime.16° Additionally, any
person who "willfully and knowingly" makes a false or misleading
statement in a required disclosure regarding a material fact is also
guilty of a crime.16 ' Finally, the Exchange Act provides a partial
defense for a person who is criminally convicted under a rule or
153. See id. § 18. The broad use of Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2006), to combat fraud and misrepresentation has significantly reduced the import of
this provision. See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS § 8.3.3, at 276 (3d ed. 2005).
154. See Securities Exchange Act § 7; cf Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The 1934 [Exchange] Act was intended principally to protect
investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon
securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.").
155. Pub. L. No. 76-768, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 80a (2000)).
156. Pub. L. No. 76-768, tit. II, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000)).
157. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
158. See Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2000).
159. Id.
160. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp.
II 2004).
161. Id.
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regulation promulgated pursuant to the Act if it can be shown that "he
had no knowledge of such rule or regulation." 62
The drafters of these Acts, and the Congress that passed them,
were operating in the criminal-law equivalent to the Dark Ages. They
believed that one word, "willfully," was sufficient to convert the
numerous activities prohibited by these Acts from matters of mere civil
enforcement to felonies associated with potentially significant prison
terms. 163 Acting some twenty years before the publication of the MPC,
they simply did not understand that the term "willfully" would
ultimately be required to serve as a stand-in for purpose, knowledge, or
recklessness, depending upon the circumstances, and that it would need
to be applied in both mistake-of-fact and mistake-of-law settings. This
understandable lack of foresight has led to confusion regarding the
appropriate or required mens rea element in securities-related
prosecutions. This confusion has been compounded by the fact that the
numerous commentators and courts who have set out to interpret the
term "willfully" under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act have
ignored the tremendous progress the MPC made in the understanding of
mens rea.
A. Commentators
Writing as late as 1995, Jed Rakoff concluded that "willfully"
means "with evil purpose" in the criminal context, 64 "whereas in the
civil context it may mean only knowingly and voluntarily, as
distinguished from accidental. "165 According to Rakoff, some courts
had approved jury instructions indicating that criminal securities fraud
might require "a higher level of intent than even mens rea"-in
162. Id.
163. Writing shortly after the enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, Judge William B. Herlands concluded that "willfully" meant "voluntarily" and
with a "bad purpose." See Herlands, supra note 38, at 148. He stressed that it did not
require proof that the defendant knew of the precise illegality of certain acts. Id at 148-
49. Further, he interpreted "willfully and knowingly"-required for guilt in connection
with misrepresentations made under the Exchange Act-to include a requirement that
the defendant knowingly made false or misleading statements. Id. at 149. Finally, he
stated his belief that, although the Securities Act left out the word "knowingly" with
respect to misrepresentations, Congress intended this requirement, and therefore it
should be read into the Act. Id.
164. Interpreted in this manner, the term provides defendants with a "weak"
mistake-of-law defense. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
165. Jed S. Rakoff, "Willful" Intent in Criminal Securities Cases, N.Y. L.J.,
May 11, 1995, at 3, 3.
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particular, a "specific intent to defraud., 166 Rakoff also determined
that, at the other end of the spectrum, a few courts had flirted with a
standard of "reckless disregard" as the necessary criminal-intent
requirement. Reckless disregard, he contended, was really a form of
willful blindness,'67 and he argued that its use in criminal cases was
erroneous.'68 Additionally, Rakoff distinguished "reckless disregard"
from two other forms of recklessness: (1) a low form, akin to gross
negligence; and (2) a "higher form of 'recklessness,"", 169 defined by one
court in a civil case as "extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care . . . which presents a danger that is either known to the
defendant or so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it. " 17°
Rakoff asserted that even the higher recklessness standard "is clearly
less than mens rea and has never been held to satisfy the intent
requirement of a criminal securities prosecution. ,171
Despite adequately summarizing the case law surrounding the issue
of mens rea for securities offenses, Rakoff's apparent oversight of the
MPC led him to conclusions as confused as those of the courts he
studied. First, he referred to mens rea in the singular,172 as if it were a
particular level of intent rather than the umbrella concept under which
all levels of intent are housed. Second, he engaged in offense-based
analysis, 17 not the element-specific analysis established by the MPC.
Third, Rakoff did not use the MPC's coherent definition of recklessness
as an analytical tool; instead, he claimed that, "in legal parlance . . .
,reckless,' like 'willful,' has many different meanings depending on
context. "17' Additionally, he failed to notice that the judicial definition
of the "higher form of recklessness" he cited misunderstood the
166. Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Fosbee, 569 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1978); Foshay v. United States, 68
F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1937)).
167. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699-701 (9th Cir. 1976)
(defining "wilful blindness" as the rule "that if a party has his suspicion aroused but
then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in
ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge" (citing WILLIAMS, supra note 47, § 57, at
157)).
168. Rakoff, supranote 165, at 10
169. Id. at 5 & n.28 (citing United States v. Henderson, 446 F.2d 960, 966
(8th Cir. 1971)); United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1971); Elbel v.
United States, 364 F.2d 127, 134 (10th Cir. 1966); Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d
70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940).
170. Rakoff, supra note 165, at 10 (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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relationship between a definition of recklessness (awareness of the
creation of a risk) and the level of proof that would cause a jury to find
that a defendant had acted recklessly under this definition (a risk so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of its creation). If the actor
"must have been aware of [the risk] creation," then, indeed, that actor
was aware of it; the two parts of the definition collapse into one.17 5
Finally, Rakoff failed to distinguish between cases that employed the
willfulness standard to decide matters pertaining to mistake of fact from
those involving mistake of law. 
176
Jonathan Eisenberg made a similar set of mistakes in his 1991
article comparing the interpretation of the willfulness requirement in
section 15(b)(4)(D) of the Exchange Act (which provides for civil
enforcement of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act) and the same
requirement in section 32(a) of the Exchange Act (which is the
underpinning of criminal liability). 177 Eisenberg first explained that the
SEC has long taken the position that a defendant is civilly liable for
violations of the securities laws as long as the defendant is aware of the
offensive conduct, regardless of whether the defendant is aware of the
illegality of those actions.178 The SEC first took this position in In re
Thompson Ross Securities Co., which involved the sale of unregistered
securities. 179 The Commissioner found the defendant liable even though
he had consulted counsel and believed that registration was not
necessary.' ° Eisenberg called this a "strict liability" interpretation of
section 15(b)(4)(D).' 8 ' He contrasted this with the courts' interpretation
of "willful" for purposes of section 32(a), which he said required "a
high level of culpability-awareness of wrongdoing, evil purpose, or
recklessness at the very least. "182
Like Rakoff, Eisenberg failed to engage in element analysis, and
he did not use mens rea terms precisely. Moreover, by employing MPC
concepts, one can expose the fallacy of Eisenberg's main argument.
The SEC's interpretation of section 15(b)(4)(D) is not one of strict
175. This assumes, of course, that the word "must" is being used to mean "was
actually aware." If it is being used to mean "should have been aware" of the risk, then
the standard for liability the Seventh Circuit employed in Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co. was negligence, not recklessness.
176. Id.
177. See Jonathan Eisenberg, "Willful Violations" of the Federal Securities
Laws: Why the SEC's No-Fault Approach Is Now Ripe for Rejection, INSIGHTS, Aug.
1991, at 13, 13.
178. See id. at 14.
179. 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
180. See id. at 1122-23.
181. SeeEisenberg, supra note 177, at 17.
182. See id. at 15.
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liability; rather, the requirement of "awareness" is a requirement of
knowledge on the element of actus reus. In other words, the actor must
knowingly sell investment instruments. It also appears to be a
requirement of knowledge on the attendant circumstance that the
"investment instruments" are unregistered. The refusal by the SEC and
courts to include an advice-of-counsel defense is simply a refusal to
make mistake of law a defense to a civil-enforcement action for the sale
of unregistered securities.'83  On the other hand, the criminal
interpretation of willfulness, at least as Eisenberg perceived it, appears
to include some measure of a mistake-of-law defense.
The difference between these two interpretations, moreover, is
actually quite defensible on policy grounds. 84 The SEC uses its civil-
enforcement powers primarily to protect the public; this requires
stopping the sale of unregistered securities regardless of the seller's
understanding of any pertinent legal obligations. Congress imposed
criminal sanctions, however, to punish; these sanctions arguably should
be reserved for situations in which the seller had some level of
intentionality with respect to violating the law.
Writing ten years after Eisenberg, Professor Margaret Sachs took a
similar position on the question of whether "willfulness" means the
same thing for criminal and civil purposes.' 85 Sachs contended that
hybrid statutes that simultaneously make the same conduct subject to
civil and criminal enforcement should be interpreted identically for both
purposes, and called this the "core principle. "186 When deciding on a
specific interpretation, Sachs counseled that a court must choose a
compromise interpretation that fits all contexts'87 and provides fair
warning to the parties.'88 Applying this analysis to willfulness as used in
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, Sachs concluded that it should
mean "either knowledge of illegality or knowledge of wrongfulness
sufficient to make illegality likely. ,189
Other than a yearning for simplicity and neatness, Sachs did not
establish a convincing reason why a statute should be interpreted the
same way in two very different contexts with different objectives at
183. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text.
184. This Article explores this argument further in connection with an
examination of the mens rea requirements for the crime of selling nonexempt securities
in violation of sections 5 and 24.of the Securities Act. See infra Part IV.C.
185. See Sachs, supra note 34, at 1029.
186. See id. at 1030-32.
187. See id. at 1033-35.
188. See id. at 1035-38.
189. Id. at 1051.
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stake. 90 Moreover, like the other commentators, Sachs discussed the
definition of willfulness in the very narrow context of mistake of law.
Although her definition of willfulness for this purpose may very well
make sense,' 9 ' it does not help when one needs to determine what
willfulness means as applied to a specific material element of a specific
securities-related crime. If Sachs had realized the breadth of mens rea
issues raised by the securities laws, perhaps she would not have
concluded that willfulness can and should have one universal
definition. 192
Confusion abounds even in an article written by Arthur Mathews,
who served as the Deputy Associate Director of the Division of Trading
and Markets at the SEC and led the SEC's Office of Criminal
Reference and Special Proceedings for several years. 93 Writing in
1971, Mathews first contended that "willful" in the criminal securities
context meant "no more than that the person charged with the duty
knows what he is doing. " 94 This position rejected entirely the majority
190. Sachs derives her four arguments from principles of statutory
construction. See id. at 1031. First, Congress's decision to enact a hybrid statute using
the same terms in both civil and criminal contexts should be honored. See id. Second,
Congress knows how to create different standards for civil and criminal liability even in
hybrid statutes; if it chooses not to, this should be understood as an intentional choice.
See id. at 1032. Third, language appearing repeatedly in a statute is presumed to have
one meaning throughout. See id. These arguments are not persuasive with respect to
mens rea, however, because Congress has demonstrated a lack of understanding of
mens rea and should not be presumed to have done anything intentionally on this front.
Her fourth argument, that "multiple constructions of a single provision are likely to be
unstable," id. at 1033, is illogical; statutory definitions are not akin to chemical
isotopes.
191. Interestingly, Sachs stakes out a middle position between the weak and
robust forms of the mistake-of-law defense. See id. at 1037-39. It is defensible,
although the "wrongfulness sufficient to make illegality likely" language is confusing.
192. See id. at 1029. Similarly, Beveridge, writing in 1996, posed the question
of whether nonfraudulent securities crimes were "strict liability" provisions, see
Beveridge, supra note 37, at 48-49 & n.72, or required mens rea-defined as "not
merely 'voluntarily' but with 'bad purpose.'" See id. at 47 & n.63 (citing Herlands,
supra note 38, at 147-48). This is a false juxtaposition. Strict liability means that the
government would not need to prove mens rea on any element of the crime. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). Courts have permitted strict liability in the criminal setting
only in public-welfare offenses, which securities-related cases-given their potential for
lengthy sentences-are not. Cf United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,
933 F.2d 35, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a crime involving a penalty of up to
five-years imprisonment and a mens rea requirement of knowledge did not qualify as a
public-welfare offense).
193. Mathews, supra note 39, at 901.
194. Id. at 950 (quoting American Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d
Cir. 1925)).
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view that willfulness has a mistake-of-law component.'95 It also
appeared to conflict with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Crosby. 196 In Crosby, the court
reversed the convictions of several broker-dealers upon a finding that,
by relying on advice of counsel, they believed in good faith that they
were not "underwriters" for purposes of the Securities Act.'97 Mathews
attempted to reconcile this holding with his prior definition of
willfulness as follows:
It is submitted, however, that a more proper interpretation of
the Crosby rationale is that the Government need not prove
actual knowledge of the specific illegality, [that is], a bad
purpose or a specific criminal intent, but rather "willfulness,"
[that is] a general criminal intent. The defendant may in some
instances be able to rebut a showing of "willfulness" by
demonstrating reliance in good faith on the advice of
counsel. '98
This explanation is incoherent. Mathews's prior claim was that
mistake of law is simply not a defense to securities crimes, 9 but the
advice-of-counsel defense used in Crosby was, by definition, a form of
mistake-of-law defense. When employing this defense, a defendant
admits to acting pursuant to an incorrect interpretation of the criminal
statute but nonetheless seeks to be excused from liability for laudably
consulting with counsel and attempting to ascertain in good faith the
contours of the law. 200 The contradiction between Mathews's claim and
the Crosby holding cannot be avoided by labeling Crosby's mistake-of-
law defense "general criminal intent."
Mathews also discussed the definition of willfulness specifically in
the context of securities-fraud cases. 20 1 He stated that the government
need not prove knowledge on the part of the defendant because
"[rieckless disregard or indifference as to whether the statements
[underlying an allegedly fraudulent scheme] are true, can constitute
sufficient 'willfulness' to sustain a section 17(a) conviction, even absent
195. See United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1187 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting
the prevailing view); see also infra notes 338-46 and accompanying text (determining
that the predominant view of willfulness is that it signifies a weak mistake-of-law
defense).
196. 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
197. Id. at 939-42.
198. Mathews, supra note 39, at 952 (citation omitted).
199. See id. at 950.
200. See infra notes 350-53 and accompanying text.
201. See Mathews, supra note 39, at 954.
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proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the
statements."2"' This claim contradicts Mathews's initial statement that
willfulness requires proof that the defendant acted knowingly, which
equates to a mens rea of knowledge on the elements of actus reus and,
presumably, the attendant circumstance of the falsity of the defendant's
representations.2"3 Knowledge, however, is not the same as reckless
disregard or indifference.204
Unfortunately, these relatively modern academic pundits are in
good company. Professor Louis Loss, the "leading American
commentator on the federal securities laws,"2 5 also failed to adequately
address the interpretation of the word "willfully" in his seminal work
on securities regulation.2 6 Written in 1951, the first edition of Loss's
treatise merely stated that this crucial term did not mean "with specific
'intent to violate the law. "207 Loss left open the possibility that the term
might require more culpability for criminal convictions than for civil
penalties, and less culpability for violations of the Securities Act's
malum prohibitum portions than for its malum in se fraud provisions;
20 8
he concluded, though, that courts had thus far been inclined to give it a
uniform interpretation. 209 The second and third editions of the Loss
treatise did not elaborate on this point.210
B. Courts
Courts have not fared any better in their efforts to interpret
"willfulness" in the many contexts in which the term arises under the
202. Id.
203. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
205. Beveridge, supra note 37, at 37.
206. See Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (1951).
207. Id. at 734.
208. See id.
209. See id. To the extent that Loss was thinking about mistake of law for
criminal-enforcement purposes, he appears to have gotten things backward. One would
presumably want to have a high mens rea standard on the issues of the existence and
interpretation of the securities laws to the extent that they are merely mala prohibitum,
so as to prevent them from being a trap for the unwary. Cf Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192, 199-201 (1991) (holding that tax cases need a robust mistake-of-law
requirement to prevent the tax laws from becoming such a trap). On the other hand, for
conduct that is malum in se, the usual rule that ignorance or mistake of law is no
defense would appear to be appropriate because, by definition, the defendant would be
engaging in conduct generally recognized as wrongful. See People v. Marrero, 507
N.E.2d 1068 (1987).
210. See 3 Louis Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1986 (2d ed. 1961); 10 LOUIS
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4758 (3d ed. 1996). See generally
Beveridge, supra note 37, at 37-39.
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securities laws. In United States v. Tarallo, a jury convicted the
defendant of participating in a classic telemarketing fraud scheme by
"solicit[ing] those called to invest in various businesses whose value
and operations were fictitious. ' ' 2 Aldo Tarallo presented an equally
classic defense-that, as a mere employee, he was "duped right along
with the investors."2 12 He claimed that he was merely following a script
and did not know that the statements he was making to potential
investors were, in fact, untrue.2 13
Tarallo's conviction included six counts of securities fraud, in
violation of sections 10 and 32 of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.
214
On appeal, he argued that the district court had failed to give a proper
intent instruction.215 Specifically, he complained that the trial court
erred when it stated that an act is done "willfully" if it is done
"knowingly," and that an "act is done knowingly if the defendant is
aware of the act and does not act or fail to act through ignorance,
mistake, or accident. , 216 The trial court further stated that the defendant
need not know "that his acts or omissions were unlawful. , 217 The court
continued
Thus, for example, to prove a defendant guilty of securities
fraud . . . based on making a false or misleading
representation, the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the representation
was false or was made with reckless indifference to its truth
or falsity, but it need not prove that in making the
representation the defendant knew he was committing
securities fraud ... or any other criminal offense.2"8
In these instructions, the trial court made several mens rea
mistakes. First, it failed to differentiate between mistake of fact and
mistake of law. In reaction to Tarallo's claimed mistake-of-fact
defense,219 the trial court initially instructed the jury that the
government need not prove that Tarallo was aware of the unlawfulness
211. 380 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004).
212. Seeid. at 1181.
213. Id.
214. Seeid. at 1180.
215. Seeid. at 1185-86.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1185.
218. Id. at 1185-86.
219. See id. at 1181 (stating that Tarallo's defense was based on his claim that
he did not "know" the statements he made were false).
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of his acts-that is, that mistake of law would not be a valid defense.22°
Second, in a fortunate non sequitur, the trial court addressed the
mistake-of-fact issue by instructing the jury that the government had to
prove that Tarallo knew the representations he made were false or that
he made them with reckless indifference to their truth or falsity.22'
Unfortunately, though, in this statement, the trial judge inadvertently
made the same mistake as Mathews by interpreting "knowingly" to
include "recklessness ' 222 without realizing that these are different levels
of intentionality. 223 The court may have erred in part because it failed to
engage in element analysis, and instead confused the element of actus
reus with the attendant circumstance of the falsity of the defendant's
representations.
Rather than shed light on these issues, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit further compounded the confusion. It, too, did not
recognize that Tarallo's main complaint was the failure of the trial court
to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, leading it to analyze the contours
of a potential mistake-of-law defense pursuant to the willfulness
requirement. 224 The court concluded that the prevailing interpretation of
"willfully" required the prosecution to prove that Tarallo knew his
conduct was "wrong" or taken with a "bad purpose" (in other words,
Tarallo was entitled to a weak mistake-of-law defense) 225 but it did not
require proof that Tarallo knew his conduct was specifically unlawful
or undertaken in violation of a particular statute, regulation, or rule
(that is, Tarallo was not entitled to a robust mistake-of-law defense).226
This interpretation, however, created a potential problem in that the
trial court had given the second half of this definition (the part
favorable to the government) but not the first half (the part favorable to
the defense).227
The court of appeals decided that the trial court's jury instruction-
that Tarallo must have known or been recklessly indifferent to the
falsity of the representations he made-cured its inaccurate
interpretation of the mistake defense.228 It reasoned that, through these
instructions, the court had informed the jury that it needed to find that
220. See id. at 1185.
221. See id. at 1185-86.
222. See id. at 1188 ("[T]o prove a defendant guilty of securities fraud ... the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the
representation was false or was made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity.").
223. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2)(b) (1962) with id, § 2.04(2)(c).
224. Tarallo, 380 F. 3d at 1186-88.
225. See id. at 1187.
226. Seeid. at 1185-87.
227. Seeid. at 1185-86.
228. See id. at 1189-90.
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Tarallo recognized the wrongfulness of his actions before it could
convict him.229 Although there is some facial logic to this position, in
reality, it collapsed Tarallo's mistake-of-law and mistake-of-fact
defenses into one, effectively depriving him of the mistake-of-law
defense to which the appellate court said he was entitled. Properly
instructed, the jury might have concluded that Tarallo knew he was
making false representations, while still finding that, because he
honestly believed these misrepresentations to be immaterial, he did not
believe what he was doing was "wrong."
The Ninth Circuit's discussion of recklessness was also lacking. It
relied on United States v. Farris, a civil case interpreting section 17 of
the Securities Act,230 in holding that reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of representations was sufficient to find securities-fraud
liability.231 Surprisingly, the Tarallo court not only ignored the fact that
Farris was a civil case, but also that section 17, under which Farris was
charged, does not contain a willfulness (or any other mens rea)
provision.232 It appears that the Ninth Circuit felt comfortable following
Farris because it unwittingly limited the operative impact of the term
"willfulness" to the mistake-of-law context, 233 thereby making it
irrelevant to the question of which mens rea should attach to the
element of falsity. By failing to understand the nature of its analysis,
the Ninth Circuit never engaged the various policy arguments that
support and undercut its interpretation.
The court's bewilderment in the mens rea arena caused it further
difficulty when it tried to compare its position to that of the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. O'Hagan.34 On remand from the Supreme
Court, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the higher court's opinion to mean
"that [section 32 of the Exchange Act] provides that a negligent or
reckless violation of the securities law cannot result in criminal
liability; instead, the defendant must act willfully." 35 Although this
language strongly suggests that the Eighth Circuit believed that a
securities-fraud conviction required something more than recklessness,
the Tarallo court managed to reconcile this language with its own
conclusion:
229. Seeid. at 1188.
230. 614 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Securities Act § 17, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q (2000)).
231. See Tarallo, 380 F.3d at 1189.
232. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (2006).
233. Cf Tarallo, 380 F.3d at 1189 ("'[W]illfully' in the context of [section 32
of the Exchange Act] is best understood to mean 'voluntarily and knowingly wrongful,'
not 'with the intent to violate the law."').
234. 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
235. Id. at 647.
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That statement might be read as contrary to our holding here.
In context, however, the Eighth Circuit's statement is
consistent with our holding that the "willful" requirement of
[section 32] does not preclude a conviction arising out of
recklessness. The Eighth Circuit held, as we do, that [section
32] "simply requires the intentional doing of the wrongful
acts-no knowledge of the rule or regulation is required."
Given that definition of "willful," the Eighth Circuit's
formulation appears to be consistent with the view that a
defendant could "willfully" violate [section 32] by willfully
acting with reckless indifference to the truth of statements
made in the course of the fraud. We therefore do not believe
that our continued adherence to Farris creates a circuit split
on this question.236
In other words, the Tarallo court interpreted the O'Hagan court as
holding that recklessness did not result in criminal liability but willful
recklessness did, thus perpetuating mens rea incoherence as recently as
2004.
C. Additional Securities-Law Cases
Mens rea incoherence in securities law cases has a long and storied
past. Judge Henry Friendly's frequently cited 1976 opinion in United
States v. Dixon is a prime example. 237 Lloyd Dixon, Jr. was the
president of a company that manufactured voting machines.238 In 1970,
he took loans from the company totaling more than $65,000.239 In a
series of maneuvers near the end of the calendar year, which included
transferring some of the loans to his father and the company's
secretary-treasurer, Dixon brought his indebtedness down to less than
$20,000.2' Dixon's indebtedness did not appear on proxy statements
made to shareholders or on the company's annual report on the Form
10-K filed with the SEC .2"1 As a result, the federal government
236. Tarallo, 380 F.3d at 1189 n.5 (quoting O'Hagan, 139 F.3d at 647).
237. 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Anish Vashista et al., Securities
Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 877, 886-87 & nn.52-53 (2005); Brian J. Carr, Note,
Culpable Intent Required for All Criminal Insider Trading Convictions After O'Hagan,
40 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1198-99 (1999).
238. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1391.
239. See id. at 1393.
240. Id. at 1393.
241. Id. at 1394.
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criminally prosecuted Dixon under section 32(a) for violating sections
13 and 14(a) of the Exchange Act.242 Dixon's defense was that he
misinterpreted the proxy rules and believed that, by getting his year-end
indebtedness to under $20,000, he was exempt from any reporting
21requirements. " 3 In fact, the rules make clear that the reference point for
reporting is not the year-end amount, but the aggregate amount at any
time during the reporting period. 244 Because this defense rested on a
supposed misinterpretation of the proxy rules, it was a mistake-of-law
defense.
On appeal, Dixon argued that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that he acted willfully, and that the trial judge's jury instruction
on willfulness was incorrect.245 Judge Friendly correctly treated the
matter as one involving a mistake of law, referring to his well-known
formulation in United States v. Peltz 24 that willfulness requires only "a
realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a wrongful act.1
247
Judge Friendly conceded that the sufficiency of the evidence regarding
Dixon's knowledge of the proper interpretation of the proxy rules
presented a "close" question, but he deemed it irrelevant:
We do not have here the case of a defendant manifesting an
honest belief that he was complying with the law. Dixon did a
"wrongful act," in the sense of our decision in Peiltz, when he
caused the corporate books to show, as of December 31,
1970, debts of his father and of [the company's secretary-
treasurer] which in fact were his own.248
242. Id. at 1391-92, 1394.
243. Id. at 1394.
244. See id. at 1391-93.
245. Id. at 1395.
246. 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970).
247. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395 (quoting Peltz, 433 F.2d at 55). Peltzis probably
the most commonly cited case for the definition of willfulness in the criminal arena.
See, e.g., Koets, supra note 37, §§ 6, 8. In Peltz, Judge Friendly made it clear that a
"person can willfully violate an SEC rule even if he does not know of its existence" as
long as that person knows the actions are wrongful. 433 F.2d at 54-55 (quoting
Herlands, supra note 38, at 149). Judge Friendly added the requirements "that the act
be wrongful under the securities laws and that the knowingly wrongful act involve a
significant risk of effecting the violation that has occurred." Id. at 55 (citing MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1962)). These latter qualifications have caused lasting confusion
because, although Judge Friendly meant to qualify the mens rea term "willfully," they
actually have nothing to do with mens rea. The first qualification is a jurisdictional
requirement; there cannot be a violation of the securities laws unless the defendant's
actions, in fact, risked a violation under these laws. See id. The second qualification is
a causation requirement, which Judge Friendly appeared to recognize by citing MPC
section 2.03, but did not directly state. See id.
248. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395-96.
2006:1563 1595
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
This is a conclusory statement. Dixon had, indeed, claimed an
honest belief that he had complied with the proxy laws.24 9 Articulated
fully, his argument would have been that he understood these rules to
be technical in nature, and that he believed in good faith that they could
be satisfied by paper transactions that temporarily shifted debt to others
who were willing to undertake the burden. Many transactions in the
business world are undertaken primarily for their regulatory or tax
consequences.25° More importantly, however, Judge Friendly should
have more carefully engaged the mens rea problem raised by Dixon's
claim. The judge substituted one kind of wrongfulness (Dixon's
admitted attempt to circumvent the proxy requirements) for another
(Dixon's purported knowledge that what he was doing was wrong). As
Judge Friendly formulated in Peltz and later reiterated in Dixon, it is
the latter mens rea that violates the willfulness provision."'
To make this point clear, Judge Friendly's rationale can be
compared to the dubious reasoning of Judge George Wilshere Bramwell
in the famous case of Regina v. Prince.252 Henry Prince took a woman
under the age of sixteen out of the possession of her father without his
consent."' His defense was that he honestly and reasonably believed
that she was over the age of sixteen, a point the court conceded. 54
Nevertheless, Judge Bramwell opined that Prince should be held liable
because his actions were immoral. 55 Although Prince dealt with
mistake of fact and Dixon involved mistake of law, the principle is the
same. In Dixon, Judge Friendly contended that Dixon could not
reasonably argue there was insufficient evidence that he knew what he
was doing was "wrong," because what he actually did was "bad."2 56 As
academics have long pointed out, this kind of analysis causes a
249. Id. at 1394 ("Dixon's principal defense was that he thought the "SEC
rules" provided for a $20,000 exemption, determined on the basis of year-end
indebtedness, rather than by the highest aggregate balance during the year.").
250. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144-46 (1994)
(accepting such a defense in connection with the structuring of monetary transactions to
keep them under $10,000, thereby purposefully avoiding the reporting requirements).
In that case, the Court interpreted the word "willful" to mean knowing that one's
conduct was "unlawful," as opposed to "wrong," thus providing a slightly more robust
mistake-of-law defense in this context. See id. at 137.
251. See Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395; Peltz, 433 F.2d at 55.
252. Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.C.C.R. 154 (1875).
253. Id. at 155.
254. Id. at 156.
255. Id. at 174.
256. See Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395-96.
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divergence between what the law actually prohibits and what the courts
think it should proscribe.257
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp. further demonstrates
courts' consistent failure to logically analyze mens rea concepts in
securities cases.258 In that case, the district court found the defendants
guilty of criminal contempt for violating section 5 of the Securities Act
by selling unregistered securities .259 The defendants admitted selling the
stock, but argued that they believed the sales were a private offering
and thus exempt from the registration requirement. 2' The district court
held that this interpretation of the securities laws was incorrect, fined
the corporate defendant $5,000, and sentenced the individual defendant
to 183 days in prison.261
On appeal, the defendants asserted that the willfulness provision
required the district court to find that they had acted with "evil purpose
or bad motive" in selling the unregistered securities 262 essentially
asserting a weak mistake-of-law defense. Contrary to the later decisions
in Peltz and Dixon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that "willful" meant only "that the defendant has intentionally sold
or offered to sell unregistered securities through the mails or in
interstate commerce. , 263 The court's reasoning revealed its ignorance of
mens rea analysis.
First, the Fourth Circuit did not appear to grasp that there are
different levels of mistake-of-law defenses. It equated the need to prove
bad purpose with the need to prove "specific intent to violate the
[law]" ;264 however, these are two very different things. 265 Moreover, in
257. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 47, § 69, at 189-90; GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 727-28 (1978). But see Dan M. Kahan, Is
Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2123 (1998).
The trial judge never told the jury that, to convict Dixon, it had to find that he was
acting with an evil motive or bad purpose. Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1397. Defense counsel
had specifically requested that the jury be charged that "willfulness, as used in this
instruction, means 'bad faith or evil intent."' Id. (quoting United States v. Murdock,
290 U.S. 389, 398 (1933)). Despite this, the court of appeals held that Dixon never
asked for the appropriate jury instruction because he failed to point out the Peltz
decision to the trial court. Id. at 1397-98. The unfairness of this holding is patent.
258. 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
259. Id. at 677. This conduct is criminal if done "willfully." Securities Act of
1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2000).
260. Custer Channel, 376 F.2d at 677.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 680.
263. Custer Channel, 376 F.2d at 680 (citing Kistner v. United States, 332
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1964).
264. Id.
265. See supra Part lI.D.
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its attempt to distinguish cases cited by the defendants, the court defied
mens rea logic. The cases, United States v. CFosby 66 and United States
v. Dard&,267 were both similar to Custer Channel. In all three cases, the
defendants were convicted of selling unregistered securities 268 and
argued that they had made a mistake in their interpretation of the
securities laws. The Crosby defendants contended that they did not
know they were "underwriters" in terms of the Securities Act, 269 the
Dardi defendants claimed they did not know they were selling stock for
a "control group, '270 and the Custer Channel defendants asserted that
they did not know that their offering was "public. "271 The Custer
Channel court distinguished Crosby and Dardi by maintaining that the
courts in those cases were
concerned with the sufficiency of the proof of knowledge,
rather than with the nature of the intent required by the word
'willful.' . . . Crosby was decided on the basis of insufficient
knowledge .... [In Dard], again, the concern appears to be
with the necessary knowledge and not with an evil motive or
specific intent to violate the law. We think, therefore, that
these cases do not cut against those . . . which indicate that
specific intent is not a requisite element of the offense.272
This reasoning-in effect attempting to isolate knowledge from intent-
is flawed.
IV. PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK OF COHERENCE
Having established the unintelligible nature of mens rea analysis in
the securities arena, it is time to suggest a framework for rebuilding it
in light of the MPC's analytical strides. From a systemic perspective,
the project must start from scratch; however, most of the substantive
interpretation of mens rea developed by the courts over the last seventy
years can be preserved. The task might be described as rebuilding the
internal framework of mens rea, but then reattaching the existing
external facing to create an entirely new edifice.
266. 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
267. 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1964).
268. See Custer Channel, 376 F.2d at 677; Dardi, 330 F.2d at 320; Crosby,
294 F.2d at 932.
269. Crosby, 294 F.2d at 938-40.
270. Dard, 330 F.2d at 326, 331-32.
271. Custer Channel, 376 F.2d at 677.
272. Id. at 681.
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The first lesson the MPC teaches is that there cannot be a singular
mens rea requirement for all securities offenses, or even for a particular
securities offense. Rather, to deal coherently with mens rea issues, one
must engage in element analysis. 273 This is true even though the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act provide only two mens rea terms:
"willfully" and "willfully and knowingly. ,274 To make sense of the vast
array of securities crimes, the term "willfully" must mean different
things in different contexts. Current law supports this position.
The Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that
"[willful] is a 'word of many meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often
.. . influenced by its context.' 275 This, in turn, has been a mantra
repeated in securities cases in the lower courts. 276 The acceptance of
multiple meanings for the term "willful" has permitted courts to find
that it requires: (1) proof that the defendant knowingly violated a
specific statutory provision in the context of the tax laws; 277 (2) proof
that the defendant was acting with an evil motive in connection with
criminal securities laws; 278 or (3) mere proof that the defendant was
acting knowingly, rather than by accident or mistake, and that the
defendant's conduct violated civil securities provisions.279
Commentators have echoed the courts' conclusion on the elasticity of
the definition of willfulness, 280 although some have argued that it should
be given a singular meaning.281
273. See supra Part 11.B.
274. "Willfully" applies to all criminal violations of the Acts and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the SEC under the Acts, while "willfully and knowingly"
applies to misrepresentations made in any report or document filed pursuant to the
Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000
& Supp. II 2004).
275. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (quoting Spies v.
United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943)).
276. See, e.g., Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
("Willfulness is usually understood to be contextual." (citing Ratzlaf 510 U.S. at
141)); United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The meaning of
the term 'willfully' varies with the context in which the term is used." (citing Ratzlaf,
510 U.S. at 141)); Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1970)
("The Supreme Court has pointed out that the term 'willful' is a word with many
connotations and that its particular use governs its particular construction." (citing
Spies, 317 U.S. at 497)).
277. See Cheek v. United States, 48 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
278. See United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing
Herlands, supra note 38, at 149); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1397 (2d Cir.
1976).
279. See Wonsover, 205 F.3d at 414; Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.
1965); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
280. See, e.g., Misty D. Shannon, The Willfulness Requirement.- A Chameleon
in the Legal Arena, 60 LA. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (2000); Carberry & Gordon, supra
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A fair reading of the legislative history underlying the securities
laws allows for multiple interpretations. Key to this conclusion is the
simple recognition that Congress passed the Securities Act in 1933 and
the Exchange Act in 1934, well before the time that the MPC brought
rationality to mens rea. Thus, neither the drafters of the Acts, nor the
Congress that enacted them, could have known exactly what the
consequences of differentiating between civil and criminal violations
through use of the word "willfully" would be.282 Evidence of this
uncertainty can be found in the congressional discussion of the term,2 83
as well as in the fact that the Securities Act simultaneously uses it in the
context of civil enforcement of certain provisions.284
Writing shortly after the passage of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, Judge William B. Herlands concluded that Congress
meant to require "guilty intent" for criminal prosecutions, which he
defined as proof that the defendant acted voluntarily and with a bad
purpose.285 Others have noted286 that Congress passed the Acts shortly
note 109, at 172; Beveridge, supra note 37, at 60-61 (stating that "willfully" has been
used in American law as an "elastic proxy for a host of mental states ranging from
'malicious' to 'not accidental"' (quoting William S. Laufer, Culpability and the
Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REv. 1049, 1067 (1992))); Eisenberg, supra
note 177, at 17.
281. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 34, at 1029-30 (arguing for a standard
interpretation of hybrid statutory schemes); Katherine R. Tromble, Humpty Dumpty on
Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed Methodology for Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REv.
521, 545-55 (arguing for a quasi-plain-meaning approach to interpretation).
282. The fact that the drafters of these Acts were experts in securities
regulation, but not in criminal law or procedure, compounded this problem. See
Herlands, supra note 38, at 139-40.
283. The congressional record appears at length in Herlands, supra note 38, at
145-46 n. 17-18 (quoting Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R.
8720 Before the H Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
113 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Hearing] (statement of Thomas Corcoran), 148
n.24 (quoting Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S.
Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 (73d Cong.) Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong. 6966-67 (1934).
284. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000
& Supp. II 2004). Section 15(b)(4) authorizes the SEC to "censure, place limitations on
the activities, functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve
months, or revoke the registration of any broker or dealer" if, among other things, the
broker or dealer has (1) "willfully made or caused to be made" false material
statements "in any proceeding before the [SEC] with respect to registration"; (2)
"willfully violated any provisions" of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, among
others; or (3) "willfully" aided and abetted the same. See id. § 15(b)(4)(A), (D), (E).
285. See Herlands, supra note 38, at 147-48; see also Beveridge, supra note
37, at 44-46.
286. See Rakoff, supra note 165 at 10 ("When Congress enacted [section]
32(a), the Supreme Court had recently confirmed the meaning to be given to 'willfully'
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after the Supreme Court handed down United States v. Murdock, in
which the Court interpreted "willful" in the same manner. 87
Nevertheless, the vagueness of "guilty intent" and "bad purpose"
arguably allows modem courts freedom to read the mens rea
requirements of specific provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act in accord with MPC principles.
The situation is slightly more complicated, however, than it
appears at first blush. Congress added the term "knowingly" to section
32(a) of the Exchange Act in connection with the crime of making false
statements in disclosure documents filed with the SEC. Thus, the mens
rea requirement for this crime is "willfully and knowingly."288 The
significance of this addition has been subject to debate. Herlands
essentially contended that it added a robust mistake-of-law requirement
for this crime;289 he supported this argument by referring to the
provision in section 32(a) that grants a partial defense for defendants
who can prove a similar lack of knowledge (regarding the existence of
the violated rule or regulation) in connection with all other securities
crimes.290
Professor Norwood P. Beveridge asserted that Congress added the
word "knowingly" because there had been some question during the
congressional debates whether "willfully" included the concept of
"knowingly";291 he contended that its addition simply clarified that the
government would have to prove that a defendant knew of the falsity of
the representations at issue.292 Translated to the language of the MPC,
this understanding of the word "knowingly" is that it requires the
application of a specific mens rea level (knowledge)293 to a specific
element of the crime of making a misrepresentation to the SEC
(falsity).294 Interpreted this way, the knowledge requirement initially
appears to provide nothing more than a constraint on mens rea analysis
in this very narrow context. In fact, it is potentially much more
significant. If Congress added the term "knowingly" merely to clarify
in the criminal context was 'with a bad purpose' ....... (quoting United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933))).
287. 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 54 (1964).
288. See Securities Exchange Act § 32(a).
289. See Herlands, supra note 38, at 148-49; see also 1934 House Hearing,
supra note 283.
290. See id.; see also Securities Exchange Act § 32(a).
291. See Beveridge, supra note 37, at 44
292. See id. at 45.
293. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1962).
294. See id. § 2.02(1) (explaining that the required mental state must exist for
"each material element of the offense"); Securities Exchange Act § 32(a).
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the definition of willfulness and not to differentiate between willfulness
and knowledge, one could argue that "willfully" includes the concept of
knowledge wherever it appears in the Acts.295 If this is correct, such an
interpretation would significantly limit flexibility in interpreting mens
rea in the securities arena. For simplicity's sake, of course, this might
not turn out to be a bad thing.296
Whatever the relationship between the concepts of willfulness and
knowledge was in 1933, in modem times willfulness is viewed as the
higher level of mens rea. Evidence to support this can be found in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,297 which Congress enacted in reaction to
the Enron debacle and the other securities-fraud cases arising out the
burst of the tech bubble in 2000.298 Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act created a new crime-entitled "Failure of Corporate Officers to
Certify Financial Reports "299-to punish a corporate officer who
certifies the accuracy of a periodic financial report "knowing that the
periodic report . . . does not comport with all the requirements [of the
Act]. "3°° Violation of this provision can result in a fine of up to
$1,000,000 and ten years in jail.3' If the corporate officer "willfully"
falsely certified a report, however, the maximum penalty jumps to
$5,000,000 and twenty years in jail. 32 Thus, Congress clearly believes
that willful conduct is worse than knowing conduct. Congress did not
give any additional insight into its understanding of the difference
between knowledge and willfulness, leaving it up to the courts to
interpret these terms.303
295. Although Beveridge does not assert this, his conclusion implies it. See
Beveridge, supra note 37, at 64 ("[Tlhe statutes do not distinguish between one willful
violation and another.").
296. See supra Part II.C (discussing the advantages of default rules for the
purpose of simplifying mens rea analysis).
297. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
298. See Maria Purez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing
Vulnerability of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REv. 7, 13 n.25 (2006) ("In the
aftermath of corporate accounting scandals involving large scale destruction of
documents at WorldCom and Enron, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.").
299. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat.
745, 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000 & Supp. II 2004 )).
300. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1).
301. Id.
302. Id. § 1350(c)(2).
303. For a discussion of section 906 by a senator who voted on its passage, see
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Certifying Statements Under Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. Holding Corporate Executives Accountable for the Accuracy of Corporate
Financial Statements, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 257, 260 (2003).
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Both the legislative history and common-law development of the
term "willful" indicate that there exists significant flexibility in
establishing its definition, providing space for courts and commentators
to use the advances of the MPC's mens rea analysis in future
interpretive efforts. Focusing on specific statutes is the only way mens
rea analysis can be rationally pursued, because the MPC teaches that
the concept of mens rea only makes sense when it is attached to a
material element of a particular crime. 3°' The remainder of this Part
demonstrates this analysis in connection with three specific securities
offenses: securities fraud, misrepresentations to the SEC, and the sale
of unregistered securities.
A. Securities Fraud
A prerequisite to analyzing mens rea is discerning the material
elements of the crime in question. 31 Securities-fraud cases are typically
prosecuted under Rule lOb-5,306 which provides three alternative
methods of committing fraud in the purchase or sale of any security: (1)
employing "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" ;311 (2) making
an "untrue statement of material fact" or omitting a material fact
necessary to ensure that statements made are not misleading;3 °s or (3)
engaging in any "act, practice, or course of business which operates.
• as a fraud or deceit upon any person. ,309
For purposes of this Article, the first and third methods of
committing securities fraud can be collapsed into one: employing some
kind of deceitful or manipulative scheme that operates as a fraud on
others. 310 This encompasses a wide range of dishonest behavior, such
as trading in a particular stock to raise its price artificially and then
dumping the stock on unsuspecting purchasers. The second method is
304. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 1, at 231
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
305. See id. § 2.02(1).
306. See Kloos et al., supra note 140, 922-23 ("Although both the 1933 and the
1934 Act deem various types of conduct unlawful, the key authorities utilized in
criminal prosecutions of securities fraud are Rule lOb-5 and section 32(a) of the 1934
Act. ") (citations omitted).
307. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5(a) (2006).
308. Id. § 240.10b-5(b). This Article will refer to the second method of fraud
set out in this provision as "making a misleading omission."
309. Id. § 240. lOb-5(c).
310. One should note that "manipulation" is a term of art, specifically referring
to activity geared toward affecting the market pricing of a security. See Heminway,
supra note 139, at 385 & n.23.
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distinct in that it envisions the deceitful scheme to focus on the
defendant's making of false statements to potential investors.
Additionally, there are three alternative jurisdictional elements: (1)
the "use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce," (2)
the use of "the mails," or (3) the use of "any facility of any national
securities exchange. ''311 Courts have also implied a mens rea element
and imbued it with different meanings depending upon the type of case
under consideration. In civil cases, the mens rea requirement is
generally called "scienter" as a result of the landmark case Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder.312 In criminal cases, it is usually called "fraudulent
intent '13 or an "intent to defraud," 314 which mean essentially the same
thing. In cases involving material misrepresentations (as opposed to
other types of market manipulation), fraudulent intent is required, but it
is sometimes said to be satisfied by proof that the defendant had
"knowledge" of the falsity of the statements in question.315 Some courts
have even held that "recklessness" on this element is sufficient to
sustain a conviction. 1 6 Superimposed upon the mens rea element in
criminal cases, of course, is the willfulness requirement. 317 Both courts
311. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5.
312. 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976); see SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2006) ("To establish liability under the misappropriation theory, the SEC must
show that Mrs. Rocklage communicated material nonpublic information, with scienter,
in violation of a fiduciary duty she owed to her husband." (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 193)).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 854 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1992).
314. See, e.g., Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1968);
Frank v. United States, 220 F.2d 559, 564 (10th Cir. 1955); United States v. Danser,
26 F.R.D. 580, 588 (D. Mass. 1959).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the meaning of "willfully" as applied to section 32 of the Exchange Act);
United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296, 305 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. White,
124 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1941).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1971).
The Hochfelder Court specifically left open the question whether the civil requirement
of scienter would be satisfied by proof of recklessness with respect to the falsity of
misrepresentations in securities fraud. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n. 12. The vast
majority of courts addressing this issue since Hochfelder have answered this question in
the affirmative. See Heminway, supra note 139, at 388 & n.46 (citing cases in which
federal courts have ruled that "recklessness is sufficient"). Prior to Hochfelder, some
courts had held that negligence was sufficient to prove fraud on a misrepresentation
theory in criminal cases. See, e.g., Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir.
1940); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1962).
317. See infra text accompanying notes 338-48, 385, 408 (discussing the mens
rea element of the various fraud crimes as it attaches to the other elements, and the
willfulness element as establishing a weak mistake-of-law defense).
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and commentators disagree as to whether, in fraud cases, this
requirement adds anything to the analysis." 8
1. FRAUD THROUGH DECEIT OR MANIPULATION
The elements of securities fraud through deceit or manipulation are
the following: (1) the defendant employed some kind of deceitful
scheme or engaged in manipulation that operated as a fraud on others
(actus reus); 319 (2) the defendant carried out the deceitful scheme or
manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
(attendant circumstance); 321 (3) the securities were purchased or sold
through the use of an interstate facility, the mail, or a national security
exchange (jurisdiction);321 (4) the defendant had an intent to defraud
(mens rea) ;322 and (5) the defendant acted willfully (mens rea) .323
The first task in analyzing the mens rea requirement for this type
of securities fraud is to determine what "intent to defraud" means. The
"scheme or artifice to defraud" language in Rule 10b-5 is identical to
language found in the mail- and wire-fraud statutes,324 and courts have
construed these statutes to require proof of an "intent to defraud" as
well.325  A typical interpretation of this mens rea requirement
necessitates proof that the defendant acted "knowingly and with the
intent to deceive someone for the purpose of causing some financial
loss . . . to another or bringing about some financial gain to oneself or
another to the detriment of a third party. , 326 This elucidation includes
the word "purpose" and apparently means it in a manner consistent
with its MPC definition.327 Understood this way, the "intent to defraud"
requirement actually adds an additional "special" purpose element to
318. See Heminway, supra note 139, at 389 n.51 (discussing the disagreement
over the relationship between the scienter requirement of a Rule lOb-5 claim and the
willfulness requirement).
319. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5(a), (c) (2006).
320. See id. § 240. lOb-5.
321. See id.
322. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (prohibiting the use of the mail in
"any scheme or artifice to defraud"); id. § 1343 (applying the same language to wire
fraud).
325. United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Deters, 184 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1999) (approving the trial
court's instruction that "'scheme and artifice to defraud' means any deliberate plan of
action or course of conduct by which someone intends to deceive or cheat another or by
which someone intends to deprive another of something of value").
326. Hawkey, 148 F.3d at 924.
327. See id.
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the crime: the prosecution must prove that the defendant had the
conscious object of either causing financial loss to another or gaining
financially at another's expense.
This special mens rea requirement should rarely pose an obstacle
for the prosecution in fraud cases involving manipulation or deceit.
Presumably, the vast majority of defendants who pursue a scheme to
defraud consciously desired to secure a financial gain for themselves at
the expense of others. Sometimes, however, a defendant might be in a
position to disclaim an intention to cause another to suffer monetarily;
though the defendant might have engaged in a fraudulent scheme, the
defendant's hope was that the targets of the scheme would ultimately be
beneficiaries of it as well. For example, a stockbroker who lies about
the prospects of an investment in order to collect fees from credulous
investors might truly hope that the investment does well and clients
make money. When faced with cases of this kind, courts retreat from
the language of purpose, making it clear that an honest belief in the
ultimate success of the venture; thus the absence of a conscious object
to benefit from another's loss does not constitute a valid defense. 328
Instead, these courts essentially define "intent to defraud" as knowledge
that one is participating in a deceitful or manipulative scheme.
3 29
A knowledge requirement is a very reasonable predicate mens rea
for criminal liability. 33' Therefore, the mens rea that attaches to the first
element-the actus reus of engaging in a deceitful or manipulative
scheme-should be knowledge. The defendant must act knowingly;
mere recklessness or negligence is not sufficient proof of mens rea in
connection with this element.
The second element requires that the fraud be "in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities." 33' Although one might suppose that
"knowledge" is the appropriate mens rea to attach to this element as
well, courts have uniformly held that a defendant who knowingly
commits fraud-thereby harming or risking harm to investors-should
not be able to defend on the grounds that the defendant did not know
the fraud was through dealings in securities, as opposed to other
instruments of commerce.332 In effect, they have taken the position that
328. See, e.g., Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir.
1968); Greenhill v. United States, 298 F.2d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 1962); Frank v. United
States, 220 F.2d 559, 564 (10th Cir. 1955).
329. See, e.g., Sparrow, 402 F.2d at 827-29.
330. See supra note 56-61 and accompanying text.
331. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (2006); see supra note 320 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (9th Cir.
1978) (holding that the government, in a securities-fraud case, need not prove that the
defendant knew that the "object sold or offered was a security"). In other words,
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this element is jurisdictional in nature: a person who engages in fraud
commits a crime; if the person uses some instrumentality of interstate
commerce, it is a federal crime, such as mail or wire fraud;333 and if it
is in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, it is the federal
crime of securities fraud.334
Treating this second element as "jurisdictional-only" is justifiable
if the penalties for mail fraud and securities fraud are roughly
equivalent. If such is the case, then the defendant is not being punished
for the securities part of the fraud, and thus holding the defendant
strictly liable on this element is not unfair. As it turns out, the penalties
for mail fraud and securities fraud are not so dissimilar as to make the
jurisdictional treatment of this element unreasonable."'
The next element-requiring the government to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's activities involved the use of an
interstate facility, the mail, or a national security exchange-is plainly
jurisdictional.336 Therefore, no mens rea attaches to it, 337 making it
incredibly easy to prove.
The last element is the willfulness requirement. The existence of
this requirement in addition to the intent-to-defraud element has led to
conflicting interpretations among commentators and courts.338 Under an
MPC-based analysis-because the intent-to-defraud element distills into
a knowledge requirement that attaches to the only other material
element of the offense-the addition of a willfulness requirement could
do one of only four things: (1) raise the knowledge requirement back
up to purpose; (2) add a robust mistake-of-law defense (requiring proof
that the defendant knowingly violated a specific statute, rule, or
Brown established that a defendant need not have mens rea with respect to the element
of trading securities. See id.
333. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
334. Cf United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676-77 & n.9 (1975) (holding
that, for the crime of assaulting a federal officer, the "federal officer" element is
jurisdictional only and thus no mens rea attaches thereto).
335. Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, the penalty for mail and wire fraud for individuals is
twenty-years imprisonment and a fine of $250,000 or twice the victims' loss or the
defendant's gain, whichever is the greatest. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 3571(b)(3), (d).
Under section 32(a), the maximum penalty for securities fraud is twenty-years
imprisonment and $5,000,000. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2004). For securities fraud under the newly created statute,
the maximum penalty is twenty-five-years imprisonment and a fine. See 18 U.S.C. §§
1348, 3571 (2000 & Supp. III 2005).
336. See PALMITER, supra note 153, § 9.1.2, at 307 (noting that the interstate-
commerce requirement is jurisdictional and "essentially a nonissue").
337. In the language of the MPC, it is a nonmaterial element. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (1962).
338. See supra Part III.A-C.
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regulation); (3) add a weak mistake-of-law defense (requiring proof that
the defendant knowingly did something wrong); or (4) nothing at all.
An examination of these options establishes the breadth of choice and
points to the right answer.
The first option-interpreting willfulness to require proof of
purpose-is not viable. Very few crimes require mens rea in the form
of purpose,339 and securities fraud should not be among them. If a
defendant knowingly acts to manipulate the securities market, the
defendant is sufficiently culpable for the imposition of criminal
sanctions. Through deceitful means, the defendant is either gaining or
attempting to gain an unfair advantage over others, and is harming or
risking harm to others. From a just-desserts or deterrence perspective,
it does not matter what the defendant's "conscious object"3" actually is.
On the other hand, the fourth option of giving the word
"willfulness" no meaning at all would violate the fundamental principle
of statutory construction that a legislature is presumed to place language
in a statute for some purpose.34 ' Thus, the willfulness requirement, as it
pertains to securities fraud under Rule 1Ob-5, should be interpreted to
make mistake of law a defense. The only remaining question is which
type of mistake-of-law defense should apply.
The pertinent willfulness requirement appears in section 32(a) of
the Exchange Act,34 2 which also contains the provision that "no person
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of
any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such
rule or regulation."343 Congress included this language in the statute
because it was worried that the securities arena would become a trap
for the unwary; it did not think it was appropriate for someone to go to
jail if that person was unaware of the rule or regulation violated. 3' This
is a robust mistake-of-law defense: a defendant can presumably avoid
confinement by showing a lack of knowledge about the crime
committed, even if the defendant knew that the conduct was wrong. As
at least one other commentator has pointed out, by making robust
mistake of law only a partial defense, Congress could not have meant
for the willfulness requirement to provide a complete defense for the
339. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. 2, at 234 ("It is
true, of course, that this distinction is inconsequential for most purposes of liability:
acting knowingly is ordinarily sufficient.").
340. See id. § 2.02(2)(a).
341. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 310(c) (2006) (discussing the presumption that all
statutory language "has a purpose and is to be given some effect").
342. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000
& Supp. II 2004).
343. Id.
344. See Herlands, supra note 38, at 190-91.
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very same type of mistake,345 especially because such an interpretation
would render section 32(a) incoherent. Rather, it makes sense to infer
that Congress intended for the willfulness requirement to provide a full
defense only in situations in which the defendant was so guileless as to
be wholly unaware that the offensive conduct was wrong. Willfulness
in the securities-fraud context, therefore, equates to a weak mistake-of-
law defense.346
One could argue that interpreting willfulness in this manner
effectively renders it meaningless because a defendant who commits
fraud through market manipulation necessarily knows that the contested
conduct is wrong.347 Admittedly, this will be true in the majority of
cases. Occasionally, however, a defendant might be able to raise a
colorable claim that, despite engaging in market manipulation, the
defendant honestly believed that the conduct provided a service to
others or that the defendant made sure that everyone got a "piece of the
action."348 Most of the time, a jury is not likely to buy this argument,
but the defense nevertheless exists, and should be available to the rare
defendant who might legitimately benefit from it.
Many courts have held that good faith is a defense to securities
fraud.349 Similarly, courts have often repeated the proposition that
reliance on the advice of counsel is not itself a defense, but is evidence
that may support a claim of good faith.35 ° Other courts have contended
that, because good faith is the mirror image of mistake of law, good-
faith instructions are unnecessary and redundant. 351' To a large extent,
345. See id. at 149.
346. Given this construction of section 32(a), it appears safe to conclude that,
for mistake-of-law purposes, willfulness should always be construed as providing the
weak rather than the robust version of this defense.
347. Cf United States v. English, 92 F.3d 909, 914-16 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the absence of a willfulness instruction was not erroneous because fraud is
an inherently bad act, and listing cases from other circuits holding that the willfulness
requirement is generally ignored in fraud cases).
348. See, e.g., Greenhill v. United States, 298 F.2d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 1962).
349. See, e.g., Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (approving of
the trial court's instruction that good faith is a complete defense); United States v.
Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Amlani, 111 F.3d
705, 718 (9th Cir. 1997)) (approving of a similar "good faith" instruction).
350. See, e.g., United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989
F.2d 1390, 1403 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,
376 F.2d 675, 683 (4th Cir. 1967)); United States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d 194, 198 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 326 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1962) (quoting Linden v. United States, 254
F.2d 560, 568 (4th Cir. 1958)).
351. See, e.g., Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1962)
(holding that an instruction on intent made the trial court's refusal to give a good-faith
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these latter courts are correct. Generally speaking, acting in good faith
implies an honest belief that one's actions are in conformity with the
law.352 Provided that the relevant statute makes ignorance of the law's
existence or a misinterpretation of its provisions a defense, a defendant
can indeed plead the mistake in exoneration. A defendant who is
entitled to only a weak mistake-of-law defense, however, gets slightly
less. To be exonerated, this defendant's "good faith" must extend not
only to a belief that the contested actions were lawful, but also to a
belief that they were not wrong or evil.353 Because of the risk that the
nuances of a particular mistake-of-law defense might get lost in its
translation to good-faith terminology, it is suggested that this
terminology be avoided-at least in the weak mistake-of-law context.
One should take note of the rationality brought to the interpretation
of securities fraud by deceit or manipulation through the use of MPC
mens rea analysis. In effect, the MPC provides that there are three
levels of mens rea operating harmoniously with respect to this crime:
First, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly engaged
in a scheme to defraud through deceit or manipulation. Second, it must
prove that the defendant knew that the actions were wrong.354 Third,
the defendant can avoid the penalty of imprisonment by demonstrating a
lack of knowledge of the violated rules or regulations."' Additionally,
the defendant will be held strictly liable on all jurisdictional elements,356
including the fact that the fraud was connected with the purchase or sale
351
of a security.
2. SECURITIES FRAUD THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION OR
MISLEADING OMISSIONS
The elements of securities fraud through misrepresentation or omission
are as follows: (1) the defendant made one or more untrue statements or
misleading omissions (actus reus);3 58 (2) the statements or misleading
instruction meaningless); cf Sparrow v. United States, 402 F.2d 826, 829 (10th Cir.
1968) (conceding that good faith would be inconsistent with intent to defraud).
352. See Tarallo, 380 F.3d at 1191 (approving the trial court's instruction that
"good faith" means "a belief or opinion honestly held, an absence of malice or ill will,
and with an intention to avoid taking unfair advantage of another").
353. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
354. That is, the government must negate a defendant's weak mistake-of-law
defense.
355. In other words, the defendant can avoid jail by persuading the judge that
he has a valid robust mistake-of-law defense.
356. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (1962).
357. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2006).
358. See id. § 240. 1Ob-5(b).
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omissions were material (attendant circumstance) ;359 (3) the defendant
made the statements or misleading omissions in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities (attendant circumstance);36° (4) the
securities were purchased or sold through the use of an interstate
facility, the mail, or a national security exchange (jurisdiction);361 (5)
the defendant acted with an intent to defraud (mens rea) ;362 and (6) the
defendant acted willfully (mens rea).363
The first issue, which arises frequently, is the interpretation of
"intent to defraud" in this context. 3" This phrase describes the mens
rea that attaches to the element of making false statements. The critical
question is whether the government must prove that the defendant knew
that the representations were false, or whether it can rely on mere
recklessness. This question is not easily answered because the language
of the statute, its common-law interpretation, and policy arguments
point in conflicting directions. Regarding the statutory language, it is
vital to note that Congress passed the Securities Act before the MPC
established the meaning of recklessness and that the word does not
appear anywhere in the statute. Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to argue that Congress specifically intended recklessness to be
the requisite mens rea.365
On the other hand, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that
recklessness would be sufficient scienter in civil securities-fraud cases
in Hochfelder,366 and every court of appeals to consider the issue has
agreed that it is, indeed, sufficient.367 Some courts have interpreted this
359. See id.
360. See id. § 240. lOb-5.
361. See id.
362. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
364. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) (stating that the
"vast majority" of crimes in Title 18 of the U.S.C. require an inquiry into mental state,
which is commonly indicated by statements similar to "with intent to").
365. See generally Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 Scienter, Reckessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179
(1986) (acknowledging that the use of recklessness as a basis for scienter is common,
but arguing that it is applied inconsistently and runs counter to precedent and the
common law).
366. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n. 12 (1976).
367. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Since [Hochfelder] . ..the "Courts of Appeals ... have held that recklessness does
satisfy the scienter requirement." (citations omitted)); see also Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1999); Hollinger v. Titan Capital
Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) (listing precedents from all
federal circuits except the Fourth, and providing similar district-court precedents from
that circuit); Cheng et al., supra note 37, at 1087 & n.46; DONNA M. NAGY ET AL.,
SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 110 (2003)
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to mean that recklessness is the necessary mens rea in criminal cases as
well.3 68 Alternatively, one could argue that the statute requires a higher
mens rea for criminal punishment than for civil sanctions by pointing
out that, in the civil context in which Hochfelder was decided, no mens
rea term appears in the statutory provision or the rule at issue;3 69
conversely, section 32(a) specifically adds the willfulness requirement
for criminal prosecutions. Although it is acceptable to read recklessness
into the statute in the absence of mens rea terminology, knowledge is
the minimum mens rea that should be read into the statute when the
term "willful" appears. Supporting this position is the fact that courts
have interpreted "intent to defraud" as requiring "knowledge" in
connection with fraud by deceit or manipulation cases.370
Complicating matters further, section 32(a) uses the term
"willfully" to make all violations of the Act's provisions criminal, but
it requires proof that the defendant acted "knowingly and willfully" for
the crime of false statements to the SEC .371 This suggests that
Congress's decision to leave "knowingly" out of the general part of
section 32(a) indicates its intent that "mere willfulness" encompasses a
mens rea requirement lower than knowledge-presumably recklessness.
The policy arguments also diverge regarding the level of mens rea that
should attach to the element of making false representations. On the one
hand, many observers have been infuriated over the last few years as a
parade of highly paid corporate executives accused of participating in
massive schemes to defraud investors through material
misrepresentations 372 defended themselves on the basis that they did not
("[Elvery federal court of appeals to confront the question has held recklessness
sufficient for these purposes.").
368. See, e.g., United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citing United States v. Farris, 614 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1979)). These cases should
not be confused with those holding that willful blindness-defined as "reckless
deliberate indifference to or disregard for truth or falsity" combined with either a
"conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth" or a "specific duty to discover the true
facts [when the] facts tendered are suspect, and [the defendant] does nothing to correct
them"-allows the inference of willful and knowing fraud. See United States v. Natelli,
527 F.2d 311, 322-23 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1975); see also, e.g., United States v. Weiner,
578 F.2d 757, 787 (9th Cir. 1978). Under the common law, willful blindness is an
accepted substitute for knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697,
700 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 206, § 57, at 159).
369. Hochfelder involved section 10 of the Exchange Act and Rule l0b-5. See
425 U.S. at 187-88.
370. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
371. See Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp.
II 2004).
372. See, e.g., Tom Petruno, Critics of Imperial Pay Taste Success, Pressure
Boards, CHI. TRIn., May 15, 2005, § 5, at 1; see also supra note 139.
1612
Mens Rea Analysis
"know" what was going on in their own companies.373 Although most
of these defenses ultimately failed,374 prosecutors would surely have
benefited from a lower mens rea standard, especially in cases against
the highest level executives, who are in the best position to insulate
themselves from the illicit activity around them. On the other hand,
given the twenty-year maximum sentence,375 and that the line between
mere puffing and dishonest representation is sometimes quite unclear,376
having in place an actual knowledge requirement for a section 32(a)
violation protects those who are not criminally culpable.
One could also argue that the mens rea standard for criminal
prosecution should, as a matter of policy, be higher than the standard
for civil actions or enforcement, in light of the prospects of
imprisonment and the stigma of conviction. Given that recklessness
suffices in the civil context,377 the level of mens rea in the criminal
arena should be knowledge. This would draw a bright-line distinction
between the behavior that will get one sued or fined, and behavior that
will land one in jail.378
Ultimately, there is no right answer to this interpretive stalemate.
Recklessness and knowledge are both perfectly appropriate mens rea
elements for criminal liability; indeed, the former is the default position
of the MPC,379 while the latter is the most commonly found
requirement in federal criminal law.3' The solution boils down to
which of the policy arguments one finds more persuasive. In light of
the recent public-company scandals and the tendency of corporate
373. See Vikas Bajaj & Kyle Whitmire, Enron Jury Unswayed by "1 Didn't
Know, 'N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al; Dan Ackman, Enron's Man Who Didn't
Know Too Much, FORBES.COM, Feb. 8, 2002,
http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/28/1128enron.htm.
374. See Bajaj & Whitmire, supra note 373; Krysten Crawford, Ex-
HealthSouth CEO Scrushy Walks, CNNMONEY.COM, June 28, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/28/news/newsmakers/scrushyoutcome/index.htm
(noting that HealthSouth founder and ex-CEO Richard Scrushy's acquittal was
"probably the first time that the defense of 'I didn't know' ... has worked for a former
chairman or CEO" (quoting Stanley Twardy, former Conn. U.S. Att'y)); see also supra
note 139.
375. See Securities Exchange Act § 32(a).
376. See Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 138 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting
that "seller's puffmg"-that is, "exaggeration within reasonable bounds"-is not
criminal).
377. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
378. Given the sliding-scale nature of mens rea, it is debatable whether the
distinction between "knowing" and "reckless" behavior is sufficiently patent to result in
a clear delineation among more and less culpable defendants.
379. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962).
380. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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officers to employ the "I didn't know" defense,381 interpreting
willfulness to mean "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of one's
representations," amounting to conduct that is a "gross deviation from
• . that [of] a law-abiding citizen,"382 is very appealing.
The next questions are whether mens rea attaches to the element of
the materiality of the misrepresentations, and if so, what this mens rea
ought to be. A statement or omission is material if there is "a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important" in making an investment decision, or if there is "a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the 'total mix' of information made available. , 383
As previously established, to convict a defendant of securities
fraud through misrepresentation or misleading omissions, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant was at least reckless
regarding the falsity of the contested statements.384 If this mens rea
element is satisfied, the defendant is culpable; arguably, one would not
want to permit the defendant to avoid punishment on the grounds that
the defendant believed the deception to be harmless. If the jury finds
that a reasonable investor would have found the defendant's
misrepresentations to be important, that should be enough for criminal
liability. In other words, one might be inclined to make the defendant
strictly liable on the element of materiality.
The remaining elements are identical to those of fraud by
manipulation and thus can be addressed succinctly. 385 The requirements
that the defendant made the statements or misleading omissions in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and that these
securities were purchased or sold through the use of an interstate
facility, the mails, or a national security exchange, are jurisdictional-
only, and thus no mens rea element attaches to them. The requirement
of willfulness should be read to provide the defendant with a weak
mistake-of-law defense.
The interpretive conclusions arrived at in this Part are undoubtedly
subject to disagreement because of differing views on matters of
statutory construction, legislative history, and the policy intended to be
381. See supra notes 372-74.
382. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
383. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see also Heminway, supra note
139, at 386.
384. See Heminway, supra note 139, at 388; supra notes 364-82 and
accompanying text.
385. See supra Part IV.A. 1 (discussing the elements of fraud through
manipulation).
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promoted by the penal law. By employing MPC analysis, however, one
avoids confusion, and interpretive alternatives become crystal clear.
B. Misrepresentations to the SEC in Violation of Section 32(a) of the
Exchange Act
Section 32(a) gives rise to criminal liability if a person "willfully
and knowingly makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any
application, report, or document required to be filed under this chapter
or any rule or regulation thereunder . . . which statement was false or
misleading with respect to any material fact."386 With modern revisions,
the penalty for violation of this provision is up to twenty-years
imprisonment and a $5,000,000 fine for a natural person, and a fine of
up to $25,000,000 for other entities.387 This penal statute is an
extremely powerful weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal because public
companies must file many reports with the SEC over the course of a
year388 and, compared to other kinds of securities infractions, the falsity
of statements are relatively easy to prove.
The elements of the crime of making false statements to the SEC
are as follows: (1) the defendant made, or caused to be made, a
statement (actus reus); (2) the statement appeared in an application or
report required to be filed with the SEC (attendant circumstance); (3)
the statement was false or misleading (attendant circumstance); (4) the
statement concerned a material fact (attendant circumstance); (5) the
defendant acted knowingly (mens rea); and (6) the defendant acted
willfully (mens rea).38
Unlike all other criminal violations of the securities laws, this one
features a mens rea element of knowledge in conjunction with the
willfulness requirement.39 ° This distinction makes the mens rea analysis
for this provision somewhat easier than for all others. Following the
MPC's default rule, when a mens rea term appears in a statute, one
should presume that the term attaches to "all the material elements of
the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears."391 In this case,
the legislative history reveals Congress's unequivocal intention that the
386. Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp. II
2004).
387. See id. (amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (2002)).
388. Registered companies must file annual, quarterly, and special reports.
Securities Exchange Act § 13(a).
389. See id. § 32(a).
390. See id.
391. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1962).
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government be required to prove that the defendant knowingly made a
false statement to the SEC.392 In MPC terms, Congress wanted the
element of knowledge to attach to the making of the statement at issue,
and to the false or misleading nature of that statement. For this
misrepresentation crime, courts have universally agreed that mere
recklessness on these elements is not enough.393
The next question is whether the defendant must know, or be
aware of the risk, that the misrepresentations are going to appear in a
report or other document filed with the SEC. The starting point for
answering this question is the default rule's presumption that the
knowledge requirement would apply to this element as well.
Although this also seems to make sense-as it would appear that the
behavior Congress sought to deter, and the harm it intended to punish,
involved interference with the SEC's ability to protect the public-
precedent does not necessarily support this position. In Dixon, the
defendant specifically maintained that he had been incorrectly informed
of the content of the reports filed with the SEC and did not know that
information about his self-manipulated indebtedness appeared in
them.395 If the mens rea of knowledge attached to this element, such a
claim would have entitled Dixon to a mistake-of-fact instruction. 396 He
did not get one, however, and the court of appeals still upheld the
conviction, 397 effectively approving of strict liability on this element.
392. See Beveridge, supra note 37, at 44-45. The legislative history
demonstrates that there was some confusion or disagreement in Congress as to whether
the term "willfully" would, standing alone, clearly express Congress's intention to
make knowledge a requirement for section 32(a) of the Exchange Act. See Herlands,
supra note 38, at 147-48 & n.24. Congress added the word "knowingly" to an amended
version of this provision, apparently to reassure skeptics. See id. at 161.
393. See, e.g., United States v. Swink, 21 F.3d 852, 855-56 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the government had to prove that the defendant knew that the set of
transactions he had engaged in was a sham, thereby leading to false statements on SEC
filings); United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
the trial judge's instruction on knowledge was sufficient despite the denial of the
defendant's request for a good-faith instruction); United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d
296, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Henderson, 446 F.2d 960, 965-66 (8th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Meyer, 359 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1966); Elbel v. United
States, 364 F.2d 127, 131-32 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d
854, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629-30 (7th Cir.
1962).
394. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
395. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976).
396. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04(1)(a) (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
397. See Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1396-98, 1402. The trial court gave a generic
erroneous "knowledge" instruction-that "an act is done knowingly if done voluntarily
and intentionally and not because of a mistake or accident or other innocent reason."
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Dixon is certainly not an outlier, as there is important precedent
outside of the securities arena that supports holding defendants strictly
liable on elements of this type. For example, in United States v.
Yermian, Esmail Yermian lied on security forms, which his employer
ultimately submitted to the Department of Defense, implicating the
general false-statements statute.39 s The statute dictates that a person
who, "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative,
or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly
and willfully . . . makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation" is guilty of a felony.399 Yermian claimed
that he did not know the form would be forwarded to the federal
government, and he asked for an instruction that, if the jury found this
claim credible, it would have to acquit.4°° The trial court refused such
an instruction, and the Supreme Court ultimately upheld its decision."
In effect, the Court determined that lying was the culpable conduct
Congress intended to punish, and that the additional requirement that
the lie be within the authority of an agency of the United States was
only jurisdictional, making defendants strictly liable on this element."°
Although the very same argument could be made in the case of
false statements to the SEC, one could distinguish Yermian on the
ground that the false-statements statute specifically uses the phrase
"within the jurisdiction of," while section 32(a) states "in any
application, report, or document" to be filed with the SEC.4"3 The
former language makes it easy to conclude that Congress intended to
make the requirement jurisdictional-only; the latter is more ambiguous.
Because the statutory language is hardly decisive, one must consider the
policies at stake. Yermian was a 5-4 decision from 1984-the height
of the expansion of federal criminal law. 5 Since that time, there has
been a great deal of criticism of the tendency of Congress and the
Id. at 1396. This was inadequate to instruct the jury that, if it believed Dixon was
mistaken as to what would be included in the SEC filings, it must acquit him.
398. 468 U.S. 63, 65-66 (1984).
399. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
400. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 66.
401. See id. at 66, 68 (reversing the appellate court's contrary holding).
402. See id. at 69.
403. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a); Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §
78ff(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2004).
404. Yermian, 468 U.S. at 63, 75.
405. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?. Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193,
201-19 (1991) (arguing that offensive conduct that had once been dealt with exclusively
in the civil-enforcement arena was increasingly being treated as criminal in nature).
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federal courts to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to an increasingly
broad universe of activity.'
Indeed, in more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has cut back
on such jurisdiction.4 7 Confronted with the issue in the context of
section 32(a), it is arguably more prudent to construe the statute
narrowly, applying it only to situations in which there is evidence that
the defendant knowingly misled the SEC. Otherwise, section 32(a)
would join the false-statement statute as one that makes lying a federal
crime if the lie happens to end up on the desk of a federal bureaucrat. If
the courts find the knowledge requirement to be intolerably high, they
could adopt a middle position by requiring proof of recklessness.
Determining the mens rea for the remaining elements is simple.
The concept of materiality does not differ from crime to crime;4. 8 thus,
the defendant should universally be held strictly liable on the element of
materiality. Finally, for the reasons discussed in connection with
general securities fraud, the willfulness requirement should be read to
provide defendants with a weak mistake-of-law defense.
C. Nonexempt Sale of Unregistered Securities
Section 5(a) of the Securities Act makes it "unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . . to make use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to sell [an unregistered] security. "'09 Section 24 of the
Act makes this conduct a crime if it is done willfully, 410 and section 4
exempts certain securities and transactions from the registration
requirement.41" '
The elements of the crime of willfully violating section 5(a) are as
follows: (1) the defendant sold a security (actus reus); (2) neither the
406. See, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of
Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997); Coffee, supra note 405, at 201-07. But
see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J.
1533 (1997).
407. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a
law prohibiting possession of a firearm within a certain distance of a school was an
unconstitutional expansion of Congress's commerce power); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the private right of action under the
Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1941 (1994), was an
unconstitutional extension of the commerce power).
408. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (1962).
409. Securities Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000).
410. Id. § 24.
411. Id. §4.
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security 4 2 nor the sale413 were exempt from the Securities Act
(attendant circumstance); (3) the security was not registered with the
SEC (attendant circumstance); (4) the defendant used instruments of
interstate commerce or the mail to facilitate the sale (jurisdiction); and
(5) the defendant acted willfully (mens rea). 16
In civil cases, section 5(a) imposes strict liability on sellers of
securities." 5 This applies to civil actions brought by purchasers to
rescind the transaction pursuant to section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act
and to enforcement actions brought by the SEC under its enforcement
powers.416 Individuals who control sellers are also jointly and severally
liable unless they can prove that they "had no knowledge of or
reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist."47 This
provision effectively grants controlling individuals an affirmative
defense if they can show that they exercised due care.
Strict liability for the sale of unregistered securities in the civil
context is necessary and appropriate. The registration requirement is
the very "heart of the Securities Act";418 along with the prospectus
requirement,"' it is the main way for the SEC to ensure that companies
issuing securities provide the public with essential information and it
enables the SEC to otherwise protect investors during this critical
period of time. Investors who have purchased unregistered securities
ought to have the right to rescind the deal, and the SEC should have the
power to immediately intercede to bring the unlawful selling to a halt.
Because civil enforcement is classically remedial in nature,42 it should
not matter whether the defendant has any mens rea with respect to the
offensive conduct.
412. Id. § 3(a).
413. Id. § 4.
414. See Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 1969)
(citing United States v. Abrams, 357 F.2d 539, 546 (2d Cir. 1966) and Kistner v.
United States, 332 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1964)).
415. See Securities Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000) (stating simply that
selling unregistered securities "shall be unlawful," without imposing further mental-
state requirements).
416. See PALMITER, supra note 153, § 6.2, at 192-93; id. § 12.2.1-.2, at 437-
39.
417. Securities Act § 15.
418. See PALMITER, supra note 153, § 4.2.1, at 109.
419. See Securities Act § 10.
420. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1938) (holding that
remedial sanctions are enforceable through civil proceedings).
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The same cannot be said for criminal enforcement, which seeks to
punish offenders and deter future violations.421 According to the MPC,
conviction of any crime requires some mens rea element;4 22 the
common law agrees, with a narrow (and controversial)4 23 exception
carved out for public-welfare offenses .44 The sale of unregistered
securities is not a public-welfare offense because, through the operation
of section 24, Congress supplied the mens rea element of "willfulness,"
and provided for a maximum sentence of up to five-years
imprisonment.4
25
The task at hand, therefore, is interpreting "willfully" as it applies
to the elements of this crime and to the possibility of a mistake-of-law
defense. Precedent in the securities arena is of little help because courts
have not confronted these issues with any clarity of thought.4 26 As to the
first element, it seems reasonable to assume that the government must
prove that the defendant knowingly sold something. The more difficult
questions are whether the government has to prove that the defendant
knowingly sold a "security" and that the security and transaction were
not exempt from the Securities Act. Because these questions deal with
the interpretation of the criminal law itself, they technically fall within
the domain of mistake of law.427 Phrased another way, the issue is
whether a criminal defendant should be able to defend against section 5
charges on the grounds of ignorance or misinterpretation of the
securities laws (that is, whether the defendant should get a robust
mistake-of-law defense).
It is quite possible to envision individuals who honestly believe
that they are selling "contracts," or "sales agreements," without
knowledge that these constitute nonexempt securities under the
definitions provided by the Securities Act4 28 and interpretative case
421. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
422. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
423. See Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-55 & n.14 (1952)
(describing various courts' and commentators' misgivings about the public-welfare-
offense doctrine).
424. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (describing how a "great"
public interest "warrant[s] the imposition of the highest standard of care" (quoting
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959))).
425. See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35,
51-52 (lst Cir. 1991) (holding that a crime involving a penalty of up to five-years
imprisonment and a mens rea requirement of knowledge did not qualify as a public-
welfare offense). In addition, the MacDonald court stated that it knew of "no precedent
for failing to give effect to a knowledge requirement that Congress has expressly
included in a criminal statute." Id. at 52 (citing Park, 421 U.S. at 674).
426. See supra Part III.B.
427. See supra Part II.D.
428. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000).
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law.429 Note that in such cases, a defendant's motivation may be
entirely innocent; section 5 does not require proof of fraud or deceit.43°
Without a doubt, the SEC should have the power to force a defendant
to cease these sales until the defendant takes the steps necessary to
conform to the law and provide full protection to the public. Whether
the defendant should also be criminally liable is less clear, but a case
outside of the securities-law arena offers some guidance.
Staples v. United States presented the Supreme Court with the
question of whether the defendant, Harold Staples, could defend his
possession of an unregistered firearm on the basis that he did not know
the rifle in his possession was, in fact, a firearm for purposes of federal
gun laws. 43' His rifle was a "firearm" only because it had been
converted to semi-automatic action, which he denied knowing. 432 The
Court determined that Staples was entitled to this mistake-of-fact
defense because mere possession of a rifle is not conduct that would put
a law-abiding citizen on notice that the possession might constitute a
crime.433 Similarly, in the context of section 5 of the Securities Act, one
could argue that the mere sale of financial instruments does not put the
seller on notice that the instruments might technically be securities.
Just as recklessness could be a good compromise to attach to the
element of "in any application, report, or document" filed with the
SEC in connection with a section 32(a) prosecution,434 it might be the
perfect mens rea for a section 5 violation as well. A defendant who is
savvy enough to risk of selling securities but who fails to clarify the
exempt status of the securities or the transaction, or to register the sale
with the SEC, arguably is sufficiently culpable for criminal treatment.
Such a scheme would shield the truly naive seller from criminal
liability, while capturing the slick operator. There is no reason why the
mens rea of recklessness cannot apply to this element.
The next element requires proof that the securities are not
registered with the SEC. As in the case of selling a "security," the
question of which mens rea requirement should attach to this element
has been left wide open by the courts. 435 Assume that the defendant,
Guilty Gayle, knows (or recklessly disregards the fact) that she is
429. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (determining
that Congress meant to define the term "security" broadly).
430. See Securities Act § 5.
431. United States v. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 600 (1994).
432. Id. at 603.
433. See id. at 615-16.
434. See Securities Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp.
II 2004).
435. See supra notes 258-72 and accompanying text (discussing Custer Channel
and related cases).
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selling securities as defined by the Securities Act. It seems fair to place
a heavy burden on her to discern her legal obligations regarding the
registration of those securities. After all, she is sophisticated enough to
know (or to be aware of the risk) that she is dealing in securities, and
she is voluntarily placing those securities into the stream of commerce.
If Gayle fails to carry out due diligence, she should risk prosecution for
a crime. In other words, she should be strictly liable on the element of
nonregistration.
While one could certainly impose a mens rea requirement on the
element in question, there is support for the imposition of strict liability
from another case dealing with the firearms laws. In United States v.
Freed, Donald Freed was indicted for possession of an unregistered
firearm.4 36 Freed argued for the dismissal of the indictment on the
ground that it failed to allege he had knowledge of the registration
requirement.437 Like Staples, Freed based his claim on the notion that
ignorance with respect to one of the material elements of the offense
should be a defense. Unlike Staples, however, Freed was allegedly in
knowing possession of hand grenades, which the Supreme Court noted
are "highly dangerous offensive weapons. '' 43 8 The Court held that
Freed would be strictly liable on the element of registration;439 if the
jury found that he possessed something as dangerous as a grenade,
Freed had the burden of determining the regulatory requirements with
which he needed to comply.n 0 Thus, it refused to dismiss the
indictment." A section 5(a) defendant who knowingly or recklessly
sells securities is in exactly the same position as Freed, and arguably
should bear the burden of understanding the pertinent regulatory
environment.
The jurisdictional element of section 5 is nonmaterial, and thus no
requirement of mens rea attaches to it. 442 That leaves the questions of
whether and what level of mistake-of-law defense the term "willfully"
supplies to a defendant." 3 Given that the penalty provisions of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act "grew out of the same program of
securities legislation and out of the same fact finding investigation,"
were prepared "by the same Senate and House Committees within a
436. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
437. Id. at 607.
438. Id. at 609.
439. Id. at 607 ("The [National Firearms] Act requires no specific intent or
knowledge that the hand grenades were unregistered.").
440. Id. at 609-10.
441. Id. at 610.
442. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962).
443. See Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1969).
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year of each other," and are structurally identical,' a strong argument
exists that willfulness means the same thing in both contexts. If so, it
would import a weak mistake-of-law defense into section 5, an outcome
generally supported by the case law." 5 The few decisions to the
contrary are either so conclusory44 or so confused"' as to make their
holdings inscrutable.
A weak mistake-of-law defense would compliment the robust
mistake-of-law defense related to the definition of a security under the
Act." 8 The government would have to prove that the defendant either
knew or disregarded the risk of dealing in nonexempt securities, and
that the defendant, in general, knew the wrongfulness of the conduct at
issue. The defendant would have the option of pressing one of the two
defenses more strongly, or both equally, depending upon the facts of
the specific case.
V. CONCLUSION
Coherent mens rea analysis requires the dissection of each penal
statute into its elements and a distinct examination of the level of mens
rea that should attach to each element. In connection with the
interpretation of a vague mens rea term, cases analyzing the meaning of
the term in connection with different crimes-or even in connection
with different elements of the same crime-are not controlling or even
necessarily persuasive precedent. Depending upon the situation, default
rules may or may not apply. This means that a statute's language,
structure, legislative history, and underlying policy must be considered
in determining the requisite mens rea for every element of every crime.
444. Herlands, supra note 38, at 142-43.
445. See, e.g., Tarvestad, 418 F.2d at 1047 (holding that a trial judge's
instruction that an act is "done 'willfully' if it is done knowingly and deliberately with
bad purpose" was sufficient); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 939-41 (2d Cir.
1961) (reversing convictions due to insufficient proof of intent, because the defendants
had relied on the advice of counsel and thus believed that the securities they were
selling did not have to be registered).
446. See, e.g., Kismer v. United States, 332 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1964)
(consisting of a four-page opinion that dealt with a double-jeopardy collateral claim and
stating the elements of a section 5 violation); United States v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp.
294 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (consisting of a three-page opinion upholding the rejection of the
defendant's requested jury instruction that the government had to prove actual
knowledge that a security was being sold in violation of the law).
447. See, e.g., United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,
680 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that a section 5 conviction does not require "evil intent"
and justifying its decision, in part, on the erroneous grounds that it is a public-welfare
offense).
448. See supra text accompanying notes 427-34.
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This Article has demonstrated that the failure of commentators and
the courts to tackle mens rea analysis head-on has resulted in lasting
incoherence in the law. Unintelligible legal doctrine does not simply
upset individuals who strive for elegant solutions to legal problems; it
also exacts a huge, real-life toll. Juries faced with incoherent legal
instructions are likely to become disillusioned about the justice system.
Citizens receive inadequate guidance as to acceptable and unacceptable
behavior, hampering deterrence" 9-particularly in the securities-law
arena, where one presumably finds mostly rational actors who would be
deterred by clear legal rules.
Although the start-up costs of implementing a rational MPC-based
mens rea scheme would not be small, the gains achieved would quickly
outweigh them. Once the appellate courts determined the requisite mens
rea for each element of every securities-related crime, specific and
detailed pattern jury instructions could be generated to guide district
courts in future cases. With proper jury instructions, defendants would
have little to complain about in future appeals. This would represent a
tremendous advance over the status quo-in which no circuit has crime-
specific pattern jury instructions with respect to the mens rea
requirements in securities cases, most provide only a vague
noncontextual definition of the term "willful,"' ° and several leave their
trial courts without any guidance at all.451
449. See Nesso, supra note 48, at 1359-61.
450. The Fifth Circuit defines "willfully" for all crimes as "voluntarily and
purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with
bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law." See COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES Ass'N OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 1.38 (2001). The Seventh Circuit takes the exact
opposite approach, defining "willful" for all securities violations as "an act . . . done
knowingly and deliberately," and stating that "the defendant need not know he is
breaking a particular law." See COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT §
4.09 (1998). The Eighth Circuit recommends that there be no instruction given on the
word "willfully" in criminal cases except for those involving tax, odometer fraud,
healthcare antikickback statutes, certain securities, and failure to pay child support. See
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.02 (2006), available at
http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/ criminal instructions.htm (last visited
August 18, 2006). The Ninth Circuit also recommends that no instruction be given to
define "willfully" unless the term appears in the statute at issue. See COMMITTEE ON
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT § 5.5 cmt. (2003). Its definition requires "that an act be done knowingly
and intentionally, not through ignorance, mistake or accident." Id. The Tenth Circuit
does not recommend any particular definition of the word "willful"; rather, it points
out that the term takes on different meaning in different contexts. See CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.38 (2005).
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A legislative solution would, of course, be even better. A review
of securities cases reveals that courts are often unwilling to overturn
convictions even when the trial judge's instructions were inadequate or
patently wrong.452 This unwillingness appears to arise out of a general
reluctance to reverse a case and send it back for a new trial when the
evidence appears to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Congressional
clarification of mens rea terminology would avoid this very costly and
time-consuming proposition. Perhaps the best solution would be for
Congress to delegate the setting of mens rea requirements for all
existing penal statutes to an appointed commission, much like it
delegated authority to the United States Sentencing Commission to
propose sentencing guidelines.453 This mens rea commission could look
at each federal statute; propose suggested MPC-based mens rea
elements based upon the statute's language, structure, legislative
history, and policy implications; and suggest default rules for the
general interpretive use. Congress would then have the opportunity to
accept or reject these proposals.
Absent legislative intervention, appellate courts could start a
project of suggesting better, more precise instructions than those
delivered by trial courts, even while upholding the "old-fashioned"
mens rea instructions that a trial court has delivered. Although these
instructions would be dicta, trial courts would understand the
significance of the message and could start implementing changes on
their own. Eventually, pattern jury instructions could be developed, and
higher courts could reverse cases coming from courts that failed to
follow the new MPC-based jury instructions.
Securities regulation is complicated enough, and determining what
constitutes a crime in this area is even more difficult. The least that the
government should do is provide clear guidance on the crucial issue of
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit describes the word "willfully" in general terms to mean
that "voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids; that is, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law." See
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES Ass'N OF THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL CASES § 9.1 (2003).
451. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits do not provide a
pattern instruction on the definition of willfulness.
452. See, e.g., United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1185-88 (9th Cir.
2004) (concluding that the proper interpretation of "willful" requires that the defendant
knowingly committed a wrongful act, but still upholding the district court's instruction
that did not mention this requirement); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395-98
(2d Cir. 1976) (acknowledging that the trial judge's instructions regarding willfulness
were erroneous in that they did not instruct the jury that it had to find the defendant had
an "evil purpose," but still upholding the conviction).
453. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2000).
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criminal mens rea. Fifty years ago, the MPC made clarity possible; it is
time now to realize this goal.
